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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
The United States is a net importer of dairy products and its exports of most 
products account for only a small percentage of total production. Its dairy trade deficit 
was $250 to $500 million from the late 1972 through the early 1990s and which has been 
growing, approaching $1 billion by 2002 (Jesse, 2003). Nevertheless, the U.S. exports 
have been on the increase in recent years with the U.S. becoming a significant player in 
the global dairy trade; competing with other countries such as the European Union (EU), 
Australia, and New Zealand.  
During the 2000 – 05 periods, the United States accounted for an average of 19, 
20 and 30 percents of total global cow fluid milk, non fat dry milk (NFDM), and cheese 
supplies, respectively (USDA/FASa). During these periods, the United States exported 
five (5) and 16 percents of total global cheese and NFDM respectively (Figure 1 and 2). 
The United States’ export share in the global dry whey market from 2000 to 2005 was 
14.5 percent (Figure 3). In 2005, over $1.6 billion worth of dairy products were exported, 
an increase of 46% over the 2003 export value of about $1.1 billion (USDA/FASb). 
Nonfat dry milk (NFDM) is the largest U.S. dairy product exported, with exports 
accounting for about 41 percent of total production while whey products are the second 
largest U.S. dairy export product; and dry whey accounted for a major part of the U.S. 
whey exports (55 % in 2005). 
2 
   Although the U.S. is a net importer of dairy products; it is a net exporter of nonfat 
dry milk (NFDM), whey products, and lactose. In 2005, NFDM accounted for about 34 
percent while whey products and cheese accounted for about 13 and 12 percents 
respectively of U.S. total dairy export value (USDA/FASb). “Other dairy products” 
comprising of food preparations not containing cocoa powder, or containing less than 10 
percent by weight of cocoa powder, and  preparations for infant use put up for retail sale, 
among others accounted for about 29 percent of U.S. total dairy export value (Figure 4). 
The primary export markets for the U.S. dairy products are Mexico, Canada, and Japan, 
and its secondary markets consist of China, South America, South East Asia, and Korea.   
As the dairy market has become more liberalized, and faced with growing 
competition at the global dairy markets, the U.S. dairy industry has used various export 
promotion programs in order to increase market shares and sales. The U.S. dairy 
producers and processors have joined forces with the federal government to implement 
export market development programs. The United States Export Dairy Council 
(USDEC), the export promotion arm of the National Dairy Board, has been at the core of 
the export promotion endeavors. As the “export market development organization”, of 
the U.S. dairy industry, the U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC) receives support for 
marketing activities from private industry as well as programs administered by the 
Foreign Agricultural Services (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Dairy 
promotions have involved a substantial outlay of resources by the United States 
government, and the dairy industry. Therefore, decision makers need to understand the 
dairy trade and policy of United States and its trading partners, and the promotion 
programs to make appropriate policy choices. 
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 The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
coordinate the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP) and the Market Access 
Program (MAP) which are non price promotion programs. From 1998 to 2005 about $5.8 
million was received by USDEC under FMDP while approximately $15.2 million was 
expended under MAP for dairy export promotion by USDEC (Table 1).  
 In a bid to address the decline in farm-level milk prices, associated with 
imbalances in milk supply and demand; a farmer-led and farmer-funded national program 
was established in July 2003. This program, Cooperatives Working Together (CWT) is 
operated within the structure of the National Milk Producers Federation. CWT has a herd 
retirement, and an export assistance program; and is opened to all cooperatives and 
independent farmers (CWT, 2008).  
A variety of studies have been conducted on the U.S. dairy industry, but these are 
limited to the impact of dairy domestic and trade policies on the industry and not the 
effectiveness of dairy export promotion expenditures ( Dobson, 2003; Manchester and 
Blayney, 2001; Bailey, 2005a). The effectiveness of promotion expenditures on domestic 
dairy products (Kaiser, 1998; Kaiser and Chung, 2000), and on export sales of various 
agricultural commodities have also been the focus of many studies in the literature. The 
impact of the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) and its prospect under the GATT 
Agreement was conducted by Dobson and Knapp (1994). Export promotion activities of 
the USDEC in some of these countries have also been reported, but this did not involve 
any empirical studies (USDA/AMS, 2004). Nevertheless, a review of literature shows 
ample studies on the effectiveness of U.S. non-price export promotion programs for non-
dairy farm and food products (Halliburton and Henneberry, 1995; Henneberry and Lu, 
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2000). Despite the various dairy market development programs aimed at promoting U.S. 
dairy exports, and the funding by the U.S. government and the dairy industry’s 
stakeholders, the impacts of dairy export promotion programs have not been adequately 
addressed in the existing literature.  
 
Objectives 
 
The general objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of dairy export 
promotion expenditures on selected U.S. dairy products’ exports. Specifically, this study 
will: 
1. Specify and estimate the foreign demand for source differentiated whey, cheese, 
and nonfat dry milk in selected countries. 
2. Estimate the impact of dairy export promotion expenditures and determine the 
impacts of other factors affecting import demand for source differentiated whey, 
cheese, and nonfat dry milk in selected countries.  
3. Evaluate the returns to U.S. dairy promotion expenditures.  
This paper focuses on dairy policies of major exporting and importing countries, 
the U.S. dairy sector, the U.S. dairy export markets, dairy export promotion programs of 
the U.S., a review of literature on the effectiveness of promotion expenditures on 
domestic dairy products and on export sales of various agricultural commodities, and an 
empirical study on the effectiveness of U.S. dairy export promotion expenditures on 
import demand for whey, cheese, and NFDM in select countries. 
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Global Major Dairy Exporters’ and Importer’ Policies 
 
Major dairy exporters are the EU, Australia, and New Zealand while the world’s 
major dairy importers include the United States, the EU, Mexico, Japan, and a few other 
Asian countries.  The global dairy markets are highly protected by various policies of 
major importing and exporting countries. However, in a bid to liberalize the market, 
members agreed to reduce trade-distorting domestic support, import barriers, and export 
subsidies. Dairy policies in the EU have their origins in the Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP) provisions of the 1957 Treaty of Rome established by the then European 
Community. The policies consist of dairy import restrictions, export subsidies for 
domestic dairy surpluses, a domestic dairy price support program, and a production quota 
for milk. The import restriction policy restricts dairy imports (with the exception of 
preferential access granted to butter imports from New Zealand) prior to the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (UR 
GATT) in mid-1995 through the use of variable levies. However under the UR GATT, 
this has been replaced with the tariff rate quota, which provides for low tariffs for in- 
quota imports and higher tariffs (that will gradually reduce), for over-quota imports 
(Dobson, 1996). Price support program begins with the intervention system and it 
provides a safety net for minimum prices of butter and skim milk powder. Apart from 
intervention program, the EU also provides for consumption subsidies on butter used in 
pastry and ice cream, and skim milk for calf feed (Bailey, 2005b). The 2003 reforms 
made provision for a cut of 25 percent in butter prices over a 4-year period beginning in 
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2005; and 5 percent in milk powder prices over a 3-year period beginning in 2005; and 
limits intervention purchases of butter to 30,000 MT annually (Blayney et al., 2006).  
 Export subsidies is an important outlet for EU excess dairy production and an 
important supplement to domestic disposal programs, (Dobson, 1996). Milk production 
quota was adopted in 1984 by the EU with the aim of keeping costs of the dairy 
intervention and export subsidies program manageable (Dobson, 1996); with the global 
quota effectively set in butterfat terms rather than crude milk delivery totals. These trade-
distorting policies have proven to be very expensive, costing roughly $2 billion euros for 
the dairy portion of CAP in 2003.  To reduce the cost of CAP and to better position itself 
in the current WTO round, efforts are made by the EU to  implement major reforms in 
their dairy policy and has agreed in the WTO negotiations to lower domestic support 
prices and to eventually eliminate all export refunds (Bailey, 2005b).   
New Zealand has an almost deregulated agricultural sector since 1984. The New 
Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) is exclusively funded by the dairy producers (Haumann 
and Wattiaux, 1999). NZDB is a monopoly exporter and owned by export dairy 
processing companies, which are in turn owned by farmers who supply the raw milk. The 
NZDB was however merged with the New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative 
to form Fonterra in October 2001 (Armentano et al., 2004). The dairy sector receives 
almost no support from the government, although Fonterra (the exporting firm) has 
retained full or partial quota rights to the U.S. and EU dairy markets for 10 years. 
Fonterra is the world’s largest exporter of dairy products, and it is involved in the 
manufacturing and marketing of dairy products. New Zealand and Australia have had a 
Closer Economic Relations Agreement since 1983, which allows for free-trade between 
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the two countries (Armentano et al., 2004). New Zealand also uses very low tariff rates 
which will be phased out in the near future for dairy products imports (Haumann and 
Wattiaux, 1999).  
 In Australia, the dairy industry was fully deregulated in mid-2000, and a free 
trade agreement exists with the United States that will allow its dairy exporters a modest 
increase in access to the U.S. dairy market (Armentano et al., 2004). Prior to 
deregulation, the dairy sector in Australia was protected by the Domestic Market Support 
Scheme (DMSS) and the State Milk Pricing Regulations (SMPR).  Introduced in 1995, 
DMSS was a federal program administered by the Australian Dairy Corporation. It 
provided support for producers of manufacturing milk, through levies on all market milk 
sold domestically and all milk used in the production of dairy products sold in Australia’s 
domestic market; while exempting milk used in producing finished dairy products 
destined for export markets from levies. The SMPR employed a milk discrimination 
device which paid higher prices to Australian farmers for market milk than for milk used 
to produce manufactured dairy products (Dobson and Wagner, 2003). 
Japan is the world’s third-largest dairy product importer, by value; after the 
United States and the EU, and it utilizes a complex network of domestic and trade 
policies. These include supply control; subsidies for milk, cheese, and cream production; 
a government/producer joint emergency fund; strict and compulsory labeling; price 
stabilization; subsidies for environmental improvements; subsidies to consumption; 
insurance subsidies; tariff-rate quotas (TRQs); and other tariffs (Obara, Dyck, and Stout, 
2005). Both the supply control and subsidies for milk, cheese, and cream production are 
voluntary. The supply control policy covers milk for most manufacturing purposes and is 
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subject to a formal, voluntary quota system administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. Farmers who participate in the program receive a direct payment, 
and this system replaced the previous deficiency payment system in April 2001. The 
Japanese government also has a program that provides subsidy to farmers who produce 
milk used in the production of natural cheese and cream (Obara, Dyck, and Stout, 2005). 
The joint emergency fund compensates farmers when prices fall. A fall in the current 
year average price below the moving average of the previous three years allows the fund 
to pay 80 percent of the difference in price to participating farmers. In Japan, the 
subsidies for environmental improvement programs pays the “extra cost” necessary for 
dairy farmers to carry out appropriate environmental management of manure and 
payments are related to the size of pasture and forage fields that are part of a dairy farm, 
and support use of manure that does not pollute the environment. The subsidies to 
consumption policy provides for subsidization of fluid milk sales in elementary and 
junior high school lunches. Japan’s dairy trade policies consist of tariff-rate quotas 
(TRQs) and tariff (Obara, Dyck, and Stout, 2005). 
Korea uses TRQs for skim milk powder, whole milk powder, and other milk and 
cream and these are allocated according to the highest-price bidders at quota auctions. It 
also makes deficiency payments to its milk producers, thereby assuring them prices 
higher than the world milk prices. Other East Asian Countries such as China, India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore also protect their dairy markets 
through TRQs and high tariffs (Cox and Zhu, 2005).  
Following the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, 
Mexico’s tariffs on most dairy imports from the United States were phased out over a 10-
9 
year period.  However, for milk powders, there is a 15-year transition period, with tariffs 
being reduced to zero in 2008 (Dobson, 2003).  Trade under NAFTA is subject to rules of 
origin.  Goods from the United States or Mexico must be produced or significantly 
transformed or processed in one of those countries to be eligible for preferential treatment 
under the terms of NAFTA.  For example, cheese imports into the United States from a 
third country but passing though Mexico with no additional processing would remain 
subject to tariffs. 
Trade barriers have been used by the U.S. to limit dairy product imports to less 
than 6% of the U.S. consumption, which allows the domestic price of milk and dairy 
products to remain above the world price (Sumner and Balagtas, 2002). In 1995, a tariff-
rate quota (TRQ) system replaced the dairy import quotas first imposed in 1951 (USDA-
FASc). The TRQ is a two-tier system whereby a low-tier tariff rate is applied to a 
specified quantity of imports, and a high-tier rate is applied to any import quantity in 
excess of the specified quantity. The United States uses the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, and the Food and Agricultural Import Regulations 
and Standards Report for foreign import procedures of food and agricultural products, 
including dairy products.  Two-tiered TRQs apply to most but not all dairy products 
imported into the United States.  Milk protein concentrate, casein products and some 
varieties of cheese are examples of products without TRQs.  Also, some TRQs are being 
phased out under bi-lateral agreements.    
Effects of liberalization of dairy policies on exporting countries’ global market 
shares have been simulated. The results show the EU’s market shares in the global butter 
and NFDM exports will decline, while its share in the cheese market will be maintained. 
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While Australia’s and New Zealand’s export shares in the butter and NFDM will 
increase, Australia’s share of other dairy products will fall. The United States will 
however maintain its position in most markets, and gain slightly in the NFDM market 
(Langley, Somwaru, and Normile, 2006). 
 
U.S. Dairy Program 
 
Government supports of the agricultural sector in most countries at the domestic 
and international levels have been an important issue. These have been made in an 
attempt to protect domestic producers, and/or consumers, to raise farm incomes and to 
ensure adequate supplies of milk; or to increase government revenues. In the U.S., 
agricultural commodity policy was developed in the 1930s, in response to the economic 
conditions of the great depression. The Federal Dairy Price Support Program (DPSP), 
Federal and State Marketing Orders and border measures are dairy policies which have 
been used in the U.S. dairy program (Sumner and Balagtas, 2002). Other domestic dairy 
programs include the Milk Income Loss Contract program (Bailey, 2005a), the Dairy 
Board Programs and the Fluid Milk Board Programs. Also, federal support of U.S. 
agricultural exports include credit guarantee programs, market development, food aid 
programs, and price subsidies programs (Henneberry and Ackerman, 1990). Furthermore, 
market promotion programs have been funded by private sources, primarily through 
producer assessments.  
In terms of domestic policy on dairy, the U.S. Federal Government has been 
supporting milk farm prices by purchasing manufactured dairy products, as far back as 
1935. The Agricultural Act of 1949 mandates the USDA to support the farm price of milk 
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through the purchase of butter, cheese and non fat dry milk from processors at 
administratively determined prices (Sumner and Balagtas, 2002). These purchases are 
done through the Commodity Credit Corporation of the USDA and the program allows a 
floor for these commodity prices by effectively setting a floor for the manufacturing 
value for milk (Bailey, 2005a). 
Milk Marketing Orders regulate the pricing of almost all of the milk produced in 
the U.S., using price discrimination. Since January 2000, regulation of the sale of 70 
percent of milk produced in the U.S. is done by 11 federal marketing orders. California 
regulates the sales of 19 percent of the country’s milk, using its own state marketing 
orders, while other state marketing orders which comprise Maine, Montana, Nevada and 
Virginia regulates most of the remainder, with a small portion not being regulated by any 
marketing orders (Sumner and Balagtas, 2002). Price discrimination is used by setting 
minimum prices that processors must pay producers for Grade A milk according to its 
end-use, by distinguishing between four end-use ‘classes’ which are fluid products; soft 
and frozen products; cheese, and butter; and dry milk under the federal orders. The 
minimum price set for milk used in fluid products is set at a premium over the minimum 
price set for milk used for manufactured dairy products.  
The Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program was mandated by a 1999 amendment to 
the 1937 Agricultural marketing Agreement Act, with a termination date of December, 
31, 2004. Using forward contracts, it allows proprietary milk handlers regulated under the 
Federal Milk order program to contract for future deliveries of milk from milk producers 
or their cooperative associations, at prices exempt from minimum federal milk marketing 
order blend prices (USDA-AMS, 2002).The program allows producers to sell futures 
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contracts which enables a price floor being established for their milk, as producers are 
able to lock in prices, and as a result of this, risks associated with price and income 
volatility are reduced.  
The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program is a program authorized by the 
Federal Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. It financially compensates 
dairy producers when domestic milk prices fall below a specified level. It is meant for 
dairy producers who, beginning December 1, 2001, through September 30, 2005, 
commercially produce and market cow milk in the U.S. or produce milk in the U.S. and 
commercially market the milk outside the U.S. (USDA-FSA, 2006). Payments are made 
on a monthly basis when the Boston Class 1 milk price falls below $16.94 per 
hundredweight. However, when the Boston price is greater than $16.94, no payments will 
be made to the dairy operator, and production for that month will not count towards the 
operator’s maximum eligible production. Furthermore, payments are made up to a 
maximum of 2.4 million pounds of milk produced and marketed by the operator in a 
fiscal year. However, the Agricultural Reconciliation Act of 2005 has reauthorized the 
program through Sept. 30, 2007, with the extended program period being called MILCX 
(USDA-FSA, 2006). 
 The National Fluid Milk Processor Promotion Program (NFMPPP) is a national 
program for fluid milk promotion and education and it was authorized by the Fluid Milk 
Promotion Act of 1990 (Fluid Milk Act). It is funded by fluid milk processors and 
designed to educate Americans about the benefits of milk, increase fluid milk 
consumption, maintain and expand markets and uses for fluid milk products in the 
contiguous 48 states and D.C. (USDA/AMS, 2004). 
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 The Cooperatives Working Together (CWT) is a producer-funded, voluntary, 
national dairy program. It was developed by the National Milk Producers Federation 
(NMPF) with the aim of strengthening and stabilizing milk prices by balancing supply 
with demand through its herd retirement, and export assistance programs. The herd 
retirement program is a program through which farmers voluntarily bid to opt out of dairy 
business and have their cows permanently removed from milk production if the bid is 
selected. CWT makes payment to such farmers upon receipts of documentations of sales 
of cows. The export assistance program is designed to financially assist CWT member 
cooperatives to compete in the global market through a bid process, by paying an export 
bonus on accepted bids. Eligible products under this program must have been exclusively 
manufactured from milk or other dairy products of U.S. origin. These include butterfat, 
cheese, and whole milk powder; while nonfat dry milk powder, and whey powders are 
not eligible to receive assistance. CWT was originally funded with a five-cent per 
hundredweight assessment on participating farmers but this was increased to ten-cent per 
hundredweight in July 2006.; and is opened to all cooperatives and independent farmers. 
CWT has carried out four herd retirements since its first herd retirement in 2003, 
resulting in the removal of 200,000 cows from the national herds. Its export assistance 
program has also assisted members in exporting over 97 million pounds of cheese, butter, 
anhydrous milk fat and whole milk powder to 51 countries (CWT, 2008). 
 
The U.S. Dairy Export Market Development Programs 
 
The agricultural sector in general and the dairy sector in particular, have been 
supported by the governments of most producing countries at the domestic and 
14 
international levels. Despite the liberalization efforts by multilateral and regional 
agreements in the global dairy market, it is still one of the most protected agricultural 
sectors (Langley, Somwaru, and Normile, 2006). In a liberalized dairy market, the 
reduced trade barriers and removal of the export subsidies on dairy products calls for the 
U.S. having to compete with other exporting countries in order to maintain or expand its 
market shares for its dairy products. Although the United States is not a big user of export 
subsidies, in order to comply with any Doha Round Agreement, the use of export 
subsidies under the Dairy Export Incentive Program ends in 2007 according to the 2002 
Farm Bill. This will have its greatest impact on U.S. NFDM exports (Dobson, 2006). In a 
liberalized dairy market, export promotion can therefore help position the United States’ 
dairy products. Emphasis on non-price market development programs becomes important 
as export subsidies are reduced. The United States’ market development efforts have 
been targeted at major export markets such as Mexico, Asian, Caribbean, and Latin 
Americans countries, among others in the form of market research, consumer promotion, 
trade servicing and technical assistance activities among others.  
In the United States, one of the programs that is the cornerstone of dairy 
promotion is the Producer Dairy Promotion Program (PDPP), which is funded by the 
dairy farmers. The PDPP was authorized by the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 
1983, as amended (the Dairy Act) and is administered by the dairy farmers through the 
National Dairy Promotion and Research Board (the Dairy Board). According to the Dairy 
Act, dairy farmers must contribute 15 cents per hundredweight for promotion and 
research on all milk produced in the contiguous 48 states that is marketed commercially 
(USDA/AMS, 2004). At least 5 cents of the 15 cents must be submitted to the National 
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Dairy Promotion and Research Board.  A dairy farmer can get credit for up to 10 cents of 
the 15 cent federal assessment if he contributes to one or more of the 59 qualified State or 
regional dairy promotion programs.  
The Dairy Board Programs are managed by Dairy Management Incorporated 
(DMI), which has been a joint undertaking since 1995 between the Dairy Board and the 
United Dairy Industry Association (UDIA)1, both of which provide funds for DMI .The 
DMI’s export enhancement program is implemented by the USDEC. This Council is a 
non-profit independent membership organization formed by the DMI in 1995, and it 
represents the interests of U.S. milk producers, dairy cooperatives, proprietary 
processors, exporters, and industry suppliers. The USDEC receives funding primarily 
from three sources: DMI, FAS, and membership dues and other. In 2005, DMI 
contributed 49% of the USDEC available fund of $15.4 million while USDA/FAS 
contributed about $6.5 million (43%), with membership dues and funds from other 
sources accounting for 8% (USDECa). Approximately $5.6 million (62%) of 2005 funds 
was spent on market development activities by USDEC.  
The U.S. government’s involvement in dairy export market development 
programs include: the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Market 
Access Program (MAP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), the Quality Samples 
Program (QSP), the Export Credit Guarantee Program (ECGP), the Supplier Credit 
Guarantee Program (SCGP), the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), and foreign 
donation programs.  
The FMDP’s goal is to develop and maintain long-term access to commercial 
markets through cost-sharing assistance to eligible non-profit agricultural trade 
                                                 
1 18 of the 59 qualified State or regional programs are members of UDIA. 
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organizations (Halliburton, Karen, and Henneberry, 1993). The MAP; formerly known as 
the Market Promotion Program (MPP), which had replaced the Target Export Assistance 
(TEA) program, is a public-private sector cooperative program. The MAP is aimed at 
developing, maintaining, and expanding foreign markets for U.S. agricultural 
commodities. Activities eligible for funding include consumer promotions, market 
research, trade shows and trade servicing. The USDEC was allocated $3.8 million in 
MAP funds and $1 million in FMDP funds in 2005, which represented 2.7 and 2.9 
percents of total MAP and FMDP allocations for the year (USDA/FASd). Both the MAP 
and FMDP are reimbursable non price promotion programs of the U.S. government The 
FMDP does not provide brand promotion assistance to cooperators, while the MAP 
provides brand and generic promotions. For dairy, the U.S. cooperator under both 
programs is the USDEC.  
 The EMP was authorized by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act 
of 1990, as amended; and is intended to foster growth in the U.S. agricultural exports to 
low-and middle-income countries that offer viable growth market. It assists public and 
private organizations in providing technical assistance in promoting market development, 
improving market access, or assisting the development of emerging market economies.  
In FY 2005, the USDEC received EMP funding of $20,000, which accounted for 0.2 
percent of the total EMP allocation for the year. The QSP was established in 1999 to help 
U.S. agricultural trade organizations provide samples of their products to potential 
importers in foreign markets. In FY 2005, the USDEC did not receive any QSP funding; 
however, in 2004, dairy was awarded $12,000 under QSP, representing 0.6 percent of the 
year’s total allocations but the proposed project was not carried out (Wolf, 2006).  
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The ECGP and the SCGP are commercial export credit guarantee programs. The 
ECGP was established with the primary goal of expediting the commercial sales of U.S. 
agricultural products. While its GSM-102 covers private credit extended to U.S. exporters 
up to 3 years, its GSM-103 covers a financing period of more that 3 years and up to 10 
years2. Although dairy was allocated $240,000 in FY 2004 in GSM-102 funds, there were 
no allocations in 2005 (USDA/FASd). The SCGP has the objective of expanding, 
maintaining, or developing markets for U.S. agricultural products in areas where 
commercial financing may not be available without a Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) payment guarantee. It enables U.S. exporters to become more competitive by 
providing direct short-term credit to their foreign buyers (USDA/FASe). The USDA’s 
CCC guarantees a large portion of payments due from importers under financing 
arrangement of up to 180 days, thereby reducing the financial risk to exporters.  Although 
dairy products are eligible for coverage under SCGP, allocation credit limits are very 
small ($80,000 in FY 2005). 
Another significant dairy market support program, the Dairy Export Incentive 
Program (DEIP), was established with the original goal of developing markets for dairy 
products where U.S. products were not competitive due to the presence of subsidized 
foreign products. Originally authorized in 1985, it remained unused for a number of 
years. When it was first funded; during the negotiations for the Uruguay Round of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (UR - GATT), export subsidies were targeted at 
                                                 
2 Beginning July 1, 2005, the CCC no longer accepts applications for payment guarantees under the 
GSM-103 program, in response to the decision by the World Trade Organization that export credit 
programs must be risk-based. Any remaining country and regional amounts from the $19 million 
originally allocated for GSM-103 in FY 2005 were reallocated to the GSM-102 program for that 
country or region. No sales were registered under GSM-103 in FY 2005 (USDA/FASc). 
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countries where the EU was competing. Under this program, the USDA could pay cash as 
bonuses to exporters of dairy products, allowing them to sell certain U.S. dairy products 
at prices lower than the costs at which the U.S. exporters acquired them. However export 
subsidies by commodity are subject to a ceiling that is determined by UR – GATT 
funding limits. Both subsidized export quantities and subsidies have decreased during the 
past decade and have now reached the new lower maximums set by WTO.  Therefore; the 
objective of DEIP has emerged into moving dairy surpluses to the global markets to 
positively impact domestic farm dairy prices. The DEIP is extended to 2007 by the 2002 
Farm Bill (USDA/ERS)3.  
 
The Foreign Market Development Program 
 
Among other export market development programs by the U.S. government, the 
Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP) is one of two, through which dairy 
products receive much funding to conduct promotion activities in foreign markets. The 
FMDP is also known as the “Cooperator Program”. First established under the authority 
of Public Law 480, the FMDP was re-authorized by Title VII of the Agricultural Trade 
Act of 1978 (USDA/FASf). The goal of the FMDP is to develop and maintain long-term 
access to commercial markets through cost-sharing assistance to eligible non-profit 
agricultural trade organizations (Halliburton and Henneberry, 1995). Under this program, 
the FAS enters into a contract agreement with a nonprofit U.S. agricultural trade 
organization that has submitted a marketing strategy, describing acceptable market 
situations, budgets and activity plans. A cooperator may seek reimbursement for an 
                                                 
3 No allocations under the DEIP were announced for FY 2005 – in 2004, $2.7 million allocations were 
made under DEIP (USDA/FASc). 
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incurred expenditure for an approved activity that would not be reimbursed by any other 
source. Types of activities are trade shows, trade advertising etc. Consumer promotions 
are not eligible activities (USDA/FASg). Preference is given to nonprofit U.S. agriculture 
and trade organization which can represent an entire industry or are nationwide in 
membership and scope. Incurred expenses of the cooperator are itemized and submitted 
to FAS for reimbursement during the market year. Commodity Credit Cooperation (CCC) 
funds partially reimburse Cooperators conducting approved overseas promotional 
activities. FMDP expenditure on dairy export promotion through the USDEC was about 
$5.8 million, and it has steadily grown over the years, since 1998 except for a slight 
decline in 2001 and 2004 (Table 1). 
 
Market Access Program 
The Market Access Program (MAP) is another of the U.S. government’s export 
market development programs through which dairy as a product is promoted in overseas 
markets. The MAP is authorized by section 203 of the Agricultural Trace Act of 1978. It 
uses funds from the USDA’s CCC for the goal of creating, expanding and maintaining 
foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products (USDA/FASh). The MAP; formerly known 
as the Market Promotion Program (MPP) in 1996, which in turn had replaced the Target 
Export Assistance (TEA) program in 1990, is a public-private sector cooperative 
program. The MAP is aimed at developing, maintaining, and expanding foreign markets 
for U.S. agricultural commodities. It is a cost – sharing program between USDA’s CCC, 
and non-profit U.S. agricultural trade associations, U.S. agricultural cooperatives, non-
profit state- regional trade groups or small U.S. businesses. Costs of overseas marketing 
and promotional activities such as consumer promotion, market research, trade shows, 
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and trade servicing are shared. Under this program, funds from the USDA’s CCC are 
used partially to reimburse program participants who are engaged in foreign market 
promotion activities. Individual companies must provide at least 50% of funding in 
respect of branded product promotion activities while for generic promotion activities, 
trade associations and others must provide a minimum 10% of funding. Promotion of 
branded products in a single country under MAP is limited to no more than 5 years. 
Activities for which reimbursement for an incurred expenditure may be granted include 
production and distributions of various types of adverts, in-store and food service 
promotions, product demonstrations, fees for participating in retail, trade and consumer 
exhibits and shows, among others. Reimbursement rates for branded promotion equal to 
the percentage of U.S. origin content of the promoted agricultural commodity or a rate of 
50 percent, whichever is the lesser (USDA/FASi). In 2004, the USDEC received about 
$3.4 million under the MAP for various dairy export promotional activities (Table 1).  
 
U.S. Dairy Export Markets 
 
The U.S. dairy exports to 143 countries of the world reached a record level of 
$1.69 billion in 2005, increasing by over 60% from about $1.1 billion in 2003. 
(USDA/FASb). Some of the factors that have contributed to the rise in U.S. dairy exports 
included reduction of trade barriers through multilateral and regional agreements, market 
development efforts, and new uses for dairy components by food processors, foreign 
expansion of U.S. food service chains and growth in the consumer market for health-
oriented products abroad. Whey proteins, lactose, milk fat and skim solids have emerged 
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as important food ingredients, due to desirable taste, functional and nutritional 
characteristics and cost advantages (Miller and Blayney, 2006). Subsidized school milk 
programs, instituted in China and Thailand and aimed at boosting per capita consumption 
of dairy and impact child malnutrition have also contributed to increase U.S. export sales 
(USDECb). 
Mexico represents the largest market for all U.S. dairy products, followed by 
Canada in 2005. Dairy export value to the Mexican market was $510 million, while it 
was $270 million to the Canadian Market; accounting for 30.3 and 16 percents, 
respectively, of total U.S. dairy export value for the year (USDA/FASb). From 1998-
2005, the U.S. dairy exports to Mexico and Canada accounted for 23% and 19% 
respectively of total U.S. dairy export value of about $9.2 billion (Figure 5). The U.S. 
exports to Mexico and Canada have been on the rise since the implementation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
 Next to the North American Markets, the Asian region represents a significant 
market for U.S. dairy exports. 32 percent of the U.S. dairy exports, valued at $541 
million were shipped to Asia in 2005 (USDA/FASb). U.S. dairy export was highest in 
Japan, followed by the Philippines, China and Indonesia. During the period 1998-2005, 
Japan imported about $814 million (representing about 9% of U.S. total dairy export 
value) dairy products from the U.S. (Figure 5). Next to Canada as the second largest 
export market for the U.S. dairy period during this period, the Asian markets ranked third 
to tenth. The introduction of a broad new menu of foods, which feature cheese or other 
dairy products by U.S. food service chains, and efforts to boost dairy consumption in the 
South East Asian countries, where dairy products have been largely absent from 
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traditional diets seemed to have boosted U.S. dairy exports to this region (USDECc). 
Innovations have also opened up new trade opportunities for some traditional milk 
products such as milk powder which are processed into functional products after 
importation to circumvent protection on finished products (Cox and Zhu, 2004). The 
United States’ dairy exports to other parts of the world constituted 31 percent of its total 
export sales value from 1998 to 2005 (Figure 5). 
 In the export market for U.S. NFDM, whey products, and cheese; Mexico was the 
largest single market in 2005. The Mexican market absorbed about 40, 24, and 30 
percents of U.S. NFDM, whey products, and cheese exports respectively. Canada was the 
second largest export market for the United States’ whey products and cheese. The Asian 
markets are next to the North American markets as destinations for the U.S dairy 
products (USDA/FASb). From 1998 to 2005, the U.S. exported about $1.26 billion 
cheese, $1.2biliion whey products, and $1.94 billion NFDM worldwide. The Mexican 
market remains the largest market for U.S. cheese and NFDM, and second largest for 
U.S. whey products. About $315 million of the U.S cheese and $836 million worth of 
U.S. NFDM were exported to Mexico, representing approximately 25% and 43% 
respectively (Figures 6, and 8).; while whey exports to this market totaled $195 million, 
accounting for 18% of total exports (Figures 7). Canada is the top destination for U.S. 
whey products and the second largest market for U.S. cheese from 1998 to 2005, 
accounting for 19% and 16% of U.S exports of whey and cheese respectively (Figures 6, 
and 7). The Asian market is a significant destination for U.S. whey products from 1998 to 
2005, absorbing 48% of total exports for this period, with Japan being the largest export 
market (15%) for U.S. whey products in the region, the third largest in the world for this 
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product. Japan also absorbs about 16% of total U.S. cheese exports (Figures 6, and 7). 
The Asian market shares in the U.S. export markets is based on the top ten destinations 
for these commodities exported by the U.S. hence, the Asian market absorbs more of 
these commodities from the U.S. than what has been discussed above.  
  
Dairy Export Market Development: A Market and Product Analysis 
 
Dairy non-price market development activities of the USDEC under the MAP 
included consumer promotions, promotions in bakery sector, and food service promotion, 
trade servicing, trade missions, technical support for use of products, seminars and 
workshops, and research (market and product) studies. FMDP market development 
activities included trade shows and the above activities under MAP with the exception of 
“promotion activities”. While retail promotional activities features prominently under 
MAP, it is excluded from the FMDP. Although MAP allows for branded promotional 
activities, USDEC does not conduct branded product promotions (Barbara Wolf, 2006). 
Trade servicing activities informs importers and dealers with the attributes of U.S 
agricultural products, and helps them procure U.S. products, while technical assistance 
teaches prospective customers about specific uses for U.S. commodities. Consumer 
promotions include store demonstrations, and display, media advertising, recipes and 
nutrition information, and event sponsorships. Consumer promotion activities are aimed 
at expanding overseas retail demand for U.S. agricultural products (Henneberry, 
Ackerman, and Eshleman, 1992). Market research provides information and guidance for 
U.S. exporters by helping them focus their efforts, thereby reducing exporters’ threshold 
for entry and/or expansion. Product research activities of the USDEC guide U.S. dairy 
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suppliers in developing products that specifically address the needs of overseas buyers. 
USDEC market development activities also include updated and accurate information on 
import tariffs, documentation, and labeling requirements; and provision of overseas 
offices which provides liaison and assistance to buyers searching for U.S. suppliers 
(Suber, 2007). These activities are supported by combined funds from the dairy check-off 
and FAS through the MAP and FMDP. USDEC is also involved in trade policy initiatives 
that maximize the effectiveness of various bilateral and multi-lateral agreements in 
providing greater access for U.S. products as well as reducing the policies, such as export 
subsidies that weakens U.S. competitiveness. However, this trade policy initiative is 
exclusive of FAS funds (Suber, 2007). 
The Foreign Agricultural Services (FAS) expenditures on dairy export promotion 
for market development in major markets for FY 1998 to 2004 for MAP, and 2000-2005 
for FMDP are shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4. These represent funds given to USDEC as the 
government’s contribution to export market development. In this section, all references to 
MAP and FMDP represent the government’s contribution to export market activities and 
are exclusive of the dairy industry (USDEC) contribution, although the market 
development activities are conducted by the UDSEC. Market development activities for 
U.S. whey products and cheese have been concentrated in the Asian markets. Between 
FY 2000 and 2005, $455,312 (59%) and $954,093 (74%) in FMDP funds was spent 
promoting cheese and whey respectively in these markets (Tables 2, and 3). In the case of 
cheese, Japan received the highest amount of FMDP promotion expenditures (about 
$233,023; representing 30% of FMDP funds). Next to Japan, Mexico comes second in 
terms of receiving FMDP funds for cheese market development with 25% of the funds 
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being spent in this market. While China received 18%, South Korea and Brazil received 
about 10% each of FMDP funds for cheese market development activities (Table 2). 
 Approximately $ 4.8 million (55%) of the total MAP cheese funds $8.7million 
was spent in the Asian market for promoting cheese and $465,780 (45%) of the total 
MAP  whey funds (Tables 2 and 3). Most of the market development activities in Asia 
were conducted in Japan, followed by South Korea, and Thailand, and Taiwan. Other 
Asian countries that benefited from cheese and whey market development activities in 
this region are Philippines, and Malaysia. Japan received the highest amount of MAP 
cheese funds with approximately $3.4 million; representing about 39% of MAP funds 
spent in this market for promotional activities. About $3 million (35%) went to the 
Mexican market promoting the U.S. cheese, followed by South Korea, receiving almost 
$1 million (11%) for cheese promotional activities. About 17% of MAP whey promotion 
expenditures were spent in Japan, while Thailand, South Korea and Mexico received 
approximately 15%, 10% and 9% respectively for whey market development activities 
with 38% going to ROW (Table 3). Total FAS promotional expenditures for the period 
under review (1998-2005) was approximately $9.5 million for cheese and $2.3 million 
for whey. Out of these, the Asian region received about $5.3 million (56%) and $1.4 
million (61%) for cheese and whey promotional activities respectively (Tables 2, and 3). 
Japan topped other markets in terms of total FAS cheese promotion expenditures 
received, with about $3.6 million (38%), followed by Mexico receiving about ($3.2 
million; representing 34%) and South Korea receiving approximately $1 million (11%). 
For whey market development activities, Thailand and South Korea received 
approximately $0.4 million each for the promotion of whey, representing 20% each of 
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total FAS whey promotion funds. While 13% of the funds was spent in Mexico, Japan 
received 10% (about $0.24 million) with approximately $0.5 million (23%) spent in 
ROW for whey promotional activities. 
In the NFDM export markets, Thailand received the highest promotion 
expenditures under MAP, and FMDP (about 33% of total expenditures). China received 
approximately 17% of total FAS promotion expenditures on NFDM, while about 14% 
and 12% were spent in Japan and Mexico respectively (Table 4). The Asian market has 
evolved as a potential market for U.S. dairy exports and in the face of competition from 
other dairy exporting countries, promotional efforts by the U.S. is important for 
expanding its market share in this region. The food processing industry is conditioned for 
solid growth. Strong economies are raising incomes, encouraging Western investment, 
fueling the food service and food retail industries, and ultimately raising demand for 
processed food, much of it with a Western blend. The Asian food processing sector has 
been projected to grow at a rate of 12 to 15 percent annually for the next five years (from 
2005). Demand for “healthier” foods, including low fat dairy products and fortified 
drinks is believed to drive expansion (USDECc). 
Cheese is the most singly promoted commodity of all U.S. dairy products for the 
period of study. In fact, under MAP, cheese promotion accounted for 50% and above of 
total MAP dairy promotional funds, from FAS contributions every year from 1998 to 
2003, and about 48% in 2004 (Table 5). For the FY 1998 to FY 2004, approximately $8.7 
million (57.4%) of total MAP dairy promotional expenditures, from FAS contributions 
was spent on cheese market development activities. Next to cheese is whey as a dairy 
product receiving about $1 million (6.8%) of MAP dairy promotion expenditures from 
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FY 1998 to FY 2004. NFDM is at a far distant third in terms of promotion expenditures, 
receiving about 1.3% of total MAP dairy promotion funds. Other dairy products which 
include yogurt, butter, ice cream, lactose, fluid milk, and infant formula, among others 
received about $5 million (34.5%) of MAP dairy promotion expenditures.  
In terms of FMDP promotion expenditures, whey products received 26.5% the 
approximately $4.9 million of total FMDP dairy promotion funds from FY 2000 to FY 
2005 (Table 6). Cheese and NFDM market development activities received about 15.8% 
and 4.6% of total FMDP dairy promotion expenditures respectively, while about $2.6 
million (53.1%) was spent promoting other dairy products. A total of approximately $20 
million was expended on U.S. dairy promotion worldwide from 1998 to 2005 (excluding 
MAP FY 2005, and FMDP FY 1998 and 1999) by the FAS (Table 7). About $9.5 million 
(47%) of this fund was spent on cheese promotion activities while whey products and 
NFDM received approximately $2.3 million (12%), and about $0.4 million (2%) for 
market development activities. Other dairy products received about $7.9 million (39%) of 
total FAS dairy promotion funds during the period of this study (Table 7).  
The U.S. dairy industry’s contribution to export market development (exclusive of 
government’s funds) as promotion expenditures through USDEC from 1998 to 2005 in 
select countries are presented in Table 8. Dairy industry’s contribution to cheese market 
development in Mexico, Japan, and South Korea during the period under review was 
about $1.30 million, $1.32 million and $0.68 million respectively, while the government’ 
contribution was about $3.26 million, $3.62 million, and $1.06 million respectively in 
Mexico, Japan, and South Korea (Table 9). Export development expenditure on cheese 
among the three markets was least in South Korea. Total promotion expenditures on 
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cheese in all the markets appear to decline over years. In Japan, total promotion 
expenditures tend to increase from 1998 to 2000, but have been on a decline since, except 
for a slight increase in 2002. While total cheese promotion expenditure in Mexico 
increased from 1998 to 2001, and has been on a decline since then; the South Korean 
market appears to have witnessed a decline in total cheese promotion expenditures from 
1998 to 2002, except for increases in 1999 and 2003 (Table 9). 
The dairy industry’s expenditure on whey market development stood at about 
$0.58 million in Mexico, $0.83 million in South East Asia, and $0.42 million in South 
Korea, compared to FAS expenditures of $0.31 million in Mexico; and about $0.46 
million in Thailand, and South Korea (Table 10). The industry’s expenditure was only 
available for South East Asia, and market development expenditures on dairy products by 
the dairy industry in this study for Thailand were unavailable. Total whey promotion 
expenditures seem to increase over time, although this does not appear to have followed a 
definite pattern. Promotion expenditures in 2005 show substantial increases over those of 
1998 in all the three markets (Table 10). 
NFDM as a product received no expenditures for market development in Japan 
from the industry from 1998 to 2005, while about $41,000; and $177,000 was spent on 
export promotion activities in Mexico, and South East Asia respectively; FAS 
expenditures on NFDM export promotion was $60,826; $48,341; and $139, 861 in Japan, 
Mexico, and Thailand respectively (Table 11). Total promotion expenditures on NFDM 
by the government and the dairy industry tend to decrease from 1998 to 2005 (Table 11), 
although increases were noted in Thailand in 2005, compared to 1998. However, it 
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should be noted that the industry’s expenditures for Thailand represent those of the South 
East Asian region. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A variety of studies have been conducted on the U.S. dairy industry, but these are 
limited to dairy domestic and trade policies effects on the industry ( Dobson, 1996,1999, 
2003; Dobson and Wagner, 2003; Manchester and Blayney, 2001;Bailey, 2005a). The 
effectiveness of promotion expenditures on domestic dairy products (Kaiser, 1998; 
Kaiser and Chung, 2000) and on export sales of various agricultural commodities have 
also been the focus of many studies in the literature (Fuller, Bello, and Capps, 1992; 
Halliburton and Henneberry, 1995; Armah and Epperson, 1997; Henneberry and Lu, 
2000). An attempt to analyze the impacts of the DEIP and its prospect under the GATT 
Agreement was made by Dobson and Knapp (1994).  
 Diverse econometric models have been used by many researchers in estimating 
the effects of promotion and advertisement on demand. Also, studies differ in terms of 
choice of variables and source of data on promotion expenditures, which may lead to 
different outcomes and conclusions about the effect of promotion (Coulibaly and 
Brorsen, 1999). The choice of functional form in demand studies are not based on a 
particular set of criteria. Several studies have been conducted on the appropriateness of 
functional forms among alternative specifications (Barten, 1993; Schmitz and Seale Jr., 
2002; Fousekis and Revell, 2000; Keller and Van Driel, 1985). Many have focused on the 
appropriate model selection in the context of a demand system.  
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Barten (1993) used the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS), the National Bureau of Research (NBR), Rotterdam, and a 
general model in demand studies for major groups, comprising of food pleasure goods, 
durables and remainder using annual data in a demand system, with a view to finding 
which model performs best. Schmitz and Seale, Jr (2002) studied the import demand for 
disaggregating fresh fruits in Japan by using a general model that nests the CBS, AIDS, 
NBR, and Rotterdam models. The AIDS and NBR specifications were rejected while 
those of the Rotterdam and CBS were not rejected. Fousekis and Revell (2000) employed 
a differential demand systems approach in estimating meat demand in the United 
Kingdom. According to this study, the Rotterdam and CBS models which are differential 
demand systems with fixed price effects are more appropriate in explaining allocation 
decisions for meat in the United Kingdom. They also reported that the parameter 
estimates from CBS and Rotterdam are very similar. Non nested tests have also been 
used to select between alternative functional forms. Alston and Chalfant (1993) 
conducted a study by selecting between the FDAIDS and Rotterdam models and found 
that the Rotterdam model is appropriate for the U.S. meat demand system. Dameus et al. 
(2001) used a Cox’s non nested test that is based on parametric bootstrap to test the 
FDAIDS against the Rotterdam demand systems. They concluded that the Rotterdam 
model better explains the U.S. demand for meat. 
 
Export Promotion 
 Lanclos, Devados, and Guenthner (1997) evaluated the impacts of advertisements 
on the U.S. frozen potatoes exports (USFP). Their studies included variables such as real 
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price of USFP, real per capita GDP of the selected importing countries (Japan, Mexico, 
Philippines and Thailand), total advertising, and per capita foreign direct investments 
represented by the food service industry investments (FSII). For advertising, U.S. annual 
Potato Board advertising expenditure in each of the four markets and third party 
advertising for USFP were used as separate variables. The number of McDonald’s 
restaurants in each of the countries was used as a proxy for total foreign direct investment 
(FDI). A single-equation model was used to estimate per capita demand equation of the 
countries investigated. Results indicated that although advertising and FSII appear to 
have smaller impacts, they are important factors influencing the per capita demand for 
USFP in the smaller markets (Philippines, Mexico and Thailand). Import demand for 
USFP in Japan (mature market) is primarily influenced by changes in income and USFP 
prices. They also found that the third party program generates larger sales increases than 
the Potato Board’s advertising program in Philippines and Thailand; with the returns to 
promotion expenditure of $11.77 and $16.36 respectively, compared to $1.42 and $1.51 
for the two countries under the Potato Board program. 
 Impacts of U.S. export promotion programs on the export demand for U.S. orange 
juice was evaluated by Armah Jr. and Epperson (1997). The study used a single demand 
equation and a linear-log functional form which included such variables as exchange rate, 
real U.S. export price of frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ), real prices of U.S. 
competitor’s FCOJ, real per capita GNP of importing country, real per capita expenditure 
on orange juice promotion program, dummy variables for countries and time trend. They 
supported the use of a single equation by assuming that the importing countries are price-
takers since in the case of citrus juice, domestic market historically takes about 90% of 
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total supplies. Annual allocation by the Florida Department of citrus for the FMD, TEA 
and MPP programs to France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
was used to measure the promotion expenditure variable. Using OLS estimation, with 
White’s heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix; it was concluded that cross-price, 
real income, and promotion expenditures had positive impacts on U.S. FCOJ export 
quantity, while U.S. export price and real exchange rate were negatively related to U.S. 
export quantity. Returns to promotion expenditure were $5.61 (Japan), $7.44 (France), 
$7.64 (United Kingdom), $37.09 (Germany) and $51.92 (Netherlands). 
 Rosson, Hamming, and Jones (1986) conducted an analysis of promotion 
response for Apples, Poultry and Tobacco; under the foreign market promotion programs. 
Total U.S. export volume was specified as being dependent on U.S. real export price, 
U.S. competitor’s real price, real U.S. expenditures for export promotion, and dummy 
variables for regions.  The model was estimated using regression analysis applied to time-
series/cross-sectional (TSCS) data. As suggested by Kmenta, data were transformed to 
address the problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity that are often associated 
with the use of TSCS data. For each equation, price variables were incorporated in three 
forms: U.S. price and competitor’s price, U.S. price alone, and the relative price. FMD 
expenditures for each of the commodities were used as promotion expenditures. Results 
indicated that export sales of apples and tobacco were stimulated by promotional efforts. 
While returns per dollar of expenditure varied across commodities, they were positive 
implying that promotional activities were successful. Over the period of 1973 through 
1981, returns per dollar of promotion expenditure was $60 and $31 for apples and 
tobacco, respectively.  
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Le, Kaiser, and Tomek (1998) analyzed the effectiveness of U.S. promotion 
expenditures for red meat in selected Pacific Rim countries. Using a single-equation 
model, double log functional form, and time-series data pooled from four countries; per 
capita imports of red meats was regressed against relative price of red meat imported 
from the U.S., relative price of U.S. red meat substitute (poultry), real GDP of the 
importing country, the exchange rate index, domestic production of red meats, U.S. 
export promotion expenditure (PRO), PRO lagged by one year, and dummy variables for 
various regions. Pooling was required due to the limited number of time series 
observations per country. Only promotion expenditures by FAS for the FMD and TEA 
programs for promoting U.S. red meat exports to Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan were used. Results from this study showed that current promotion 
expenditures had positive effects on Taiwan and South Korea markets, but was only 
significant in South Korea. Lagged promotion expenditure was also shown to have a 
positive effect in all export markets, except in Hong Kong. The econometric estimates 
obtained were used as a basis for a simulation of scenarios involving the re-allocation of 
promotion expenditures among countries. Simulation results suggest that the total value 
of U.S. red meat exports would have increased by 102% in all the four countries from 
1985 to 1994 if promotion expenditure in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were 
reduced by 90% and reallocated to the South Korean market. 
 Kaiser, Liu, and Consignado (2003) measured the economic impacts of California 
raisin export promotion program in Japan and the United Kingdom (U.K). A single-
equation, double log import demand, using time series data for Japan and U.K. from 1965 
to 1998 was used. Single equation was used because of the difficulty of obtaining all the 
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relevant data on related commodities which were required if a demand systems approach 
are used. Variables included in the model were real price of California raisins, real price 
of competing suppliers’ (Australia and South Africa in Japan and Greece and Turkey in 
the U.K.) raisins, retail price index of bakery products in the importing country as 
substitutes or complements), real per capita GDP of the importing country and real 
California raisin industry’s export promotion expenditure. Promotion expenditure was 
based on expenditure on export programs operated by the Raisin Administrative 
Committee in Japan and the U.K. The authors concluded that export promotion programs 
increased demand for raisins in Japan and the U.K. with the export promotion elasticity 
of 0.029 in Japan and 0.133 in the U.K. Prices of California raisins and competitors’ 
prices were consistent with prior expectations and were found to be important in 
determining per capita import demand of Japan and the U.K. 
 An evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S. non- price promotion programs for 
almonds in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore was conducted by 
Halliburton and Henneberry (1995). In the model in this study, total quantity of almond 
imports from the U.S. was specified to be a function of unit import price of almonds, 
price of almond substitutes and complements, total GDP of importing countries, U.S. 
export promotion expenditures for almonds (PRO), one year lag of PRO, country 
dummies, and the time trend. The study applied Time Series Cross Sectional data to three 
different specifications (Cobb-Douglass, linear and log-linear). For the promotion 
variable, U.S. government expenditures for the TEA and MPP programs were used. 
While current promotion expenditures were not found to have significant effects in South 
Korea and Singapore, promotion was found effective in Taiwan, using a linear as well as 
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an exponential functional form. The coefficient of one- year lagged promotion 
expenditures was not significant in Singapore and South Korea, but it was found 
significant in the other three countries. Using the linear model, returns to promotion 
expenditures ranged from $4 to $9 for every dollar of TEA and MPP spent in Japan, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
 Henneberry and Lu (2000) evaluated the effectiveness of U.S. non price 
promotional programs for wheat in Japan, Korea, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco; using the 
linear approximation of an almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS). Three separate 
models were considered. Model I included prices of U.S. wheat, price of U.S. 
competitor’s wheat, total expenditure on wheat and U.S. export promotion expenditures. 
Model II included all the variables in model I and price of imported wheat substitute, not 
differentiated by source. Model III included all the variables in model II in addition to 
quantities of productions of all domestic cereals. U.S. export promotion expenditures 
were based on data obtained from FAS and the U.S. Wheat Associates. They reported 
that the impact of U.S. export promotion expenditure was small in magnitude but positive 
and significant in Japan and Korea. Expenditure and own-price elasticities had signs that 
were consistent with economic theory and were more important than promotion 
expenditures. Wheat from other sources was also shown to compete with U.S. wheat. 
Return on investment was reported to be $23.30 (Japan) and $69.90 (Korea). Results of 
the three models were consistent, implying robustness of the estimators. 
 The effects of U.S. promotion programs and trade policies of importing countries 
on the import demand for U.S. fresh grapefruits (USFGF) in Japan, France, Canada, and 
the Netherlands were analyzed by Fuller, Bello, and Capps (1992). The study specified 
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four-single equation import demand functions and estimated these by joint generalized 
least squares. Single equation was used based on the assumption that the fresh grapefruit 
price faced by U.S. importers is exogenous, as the domestic grapefruit market in the U.S. 
takes about 90% of the U.S. grapefruit production. The importing countries are therefore 
assumed to be price-takers. Per capita imports of USFGF was dependent on real per 
capita GDP of importing country, real price of USFGF substitute, promotion expenditure 
on USFGF, ad-valorem tariff rate in importing country, quota removal by Japan, 
quarterly dummy variables and time trend. The results of the study showed that 
promotion expenditure had a significant influence on USFGF exports. Removal of 
Japan’s import quota on USFGF in June 1971 was also reported to have significantly 
increased per capita imports by 0.296 pounds per quarter. 
 Onunkwo and Epperson (2000a) examined the impacts of U.S. export promotion 
programs on the export demand for U.S. pecans in Asia and the EU. A single equation, 
log-linear model, with total volume of U.S. pecan exports specified to be a function of  
real price of U.S. pecans, real price of U.S. walnuts, real price of U.S. almonds, real 
GDP, real promotion expenditures on U.S. pecans, real promotion expenditures on U.S. 
walnuts, real promotion expenditures on U.S. almonds, and dummy variables for region 
was used. OLS white’s heteroskedasticity-consistent matrix and Newey-West 
autocorrelation-consistent matrix, with order one were used in the estimation procedure. 
The authors reported returns per dollar of pecan promotion expenditure of $6.45 for Asia 
and $6.75 for the EU. A summary of some promotion studies showing the returns to 
promotion expenditures are shown in Table 15. 
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Dobson and Knapp (1994) analyzed the impacts of the Dairy Export Incentive 
Program (DEIP) from 1992 to mid-1994 and prospects for the DEIP under the GATT 
Agreement, using a mathematical programming method. DEIP was reported to have 
helped in maintaining or expanding markets for U.S. dairy products.  Also Simulation 
results as reported by the authors indicated an increase of less than 0.2% in producer 
surplus, less subsidy costs for the U.S., compared to base situation. The results also 
indicated a strong market penetration by the EU in major Nonfat Dry Milk (NFDM) 
markets. They further reported that the amount of NFDM that can be exported with 
subsidy will decline by about 40% in 2000 under GATT, compared to average exports 
under DEIP in 1992-1993, while cheese exports will not be affected much. 
 
Import Demand 
 Previous studies on import demand for various commodities have been estimated, 
without incorporating export promotion as a variable. Tanyeri-Abur and Rosson (1997) 
conducted a study on the Mexican import demand for dairy products from 1996 to 2000. 
A double log functional form was used with total quantity of dairy products imports as 
the dependent variable. Explanatory variables in the study were lagged quantity of dairy 
product’s imports, real exchange rate, real GDP in Mexico and dummy variable for time 
period. They reported a strong relationship between income and both fluid milk and 
cheese imports. Cheese and NFDM own-price elasticities were inelastic while income 
elasticities exhibited an elastic response. Real exchange rate and import of previous 
period for fluid milk and cheese were also reported to be significant. 
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 Balagtas, Coulibaly, and Diarra (2006) estimated an import demand for dairy 
products in Cote d’Ivoire using an LA/AIDS model. Monthly data from 1996 to 2005 
was used in specifying the Ivorian import demand for yogurt, milk powder, cream, butter, 
cheese, condensed milk, and fluid milk; incorporating monthly variables. While yogurt, 
fluid milk and cream demand are elastic, demand for milk powder is inelastic. 
Expenditure elasticity of all the dairy products are inelastic (reflecting these products as 
necessities in Cote d’Ivoire), with the exception of condensed milk. 
 Yang and Koo (1994) estimated import demand equations for meat in Japan, 
using the source differentiated AIDS model. Budget shares of source differentiated meat 
was the dependent variable and natural log of prices of meats, natural log of expenditures 
on meat as explanatory variables. It was concluded that the U.S. has the largest potential 
for beef exports to Japan while Thailand and China have strong market position for 
poultry. The U.S. was also reported to compete with Canada and Taiwan in the pork 
market and with Thailand in the poultry market. 
 Chang and Hsia (2000) investigated the beef import market shares of Australia, 
New Zealand, and the U.S. in Taiwan and implications for Australia using a volume 
share model. The choice of the model above the more flexible demand systems (AIDS 
and LA/AIDS) was based on more reasonable results in terms of goodness-of-fit, signs, 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients and its being a common measure of market share 
and competitive market position in marketing literature (Chang and Hsia, 2000). Volume 
share of supply source (Australia, New Zealand, and U.S.) was specified as depending on 
relative prices of frozen imported beef, monthly earnings normalized by the average unit 
import value of Australian frozen beef and monthly dummy variables as seasonality 
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variable. The authors reported that relative beef prices and consumers incomes were 
important factors influencing suppliers’ market shares. Australian beef was also 
considered to be an inferior good. 
 
Domestic Dairy Advertisement/Promotion 
 Studies on the effects of domestic advertisement/promotion on the demand for 
dairy product include Kaiser and Reberte (1996), Kaiser and Chung (2000), Hill et al. 
(1999), Ward and McDonald (1986), Kaiser (1998). Kaiser and Reberte (1996) examined 
the impact of generic fluid milk advertising on whole, low fat and skim milk demand, 
using a double log functional form. Per capita demand for whole, low fat and skim milk 
was dependent on per capita fluid milk advertising expenditures, retail prices of whole, 
low fat and skim milk; retail prices of milk substitute, per capita income, seasonal 
quarterly dummy and a health index. The health index was constructed based on the 
percentage of consumers expressing fat concern in a survey. Fluid milk advertising 
campaign in New York City was reported to have positive influence on whole, low fat 
and skim milk demand. 
 Kaiser and Chung (2000) analyzed the impact of generic milk advertising in New 
York State markets. Quantity of fluid milk in selected cities was regressed on retail milk 
price, substitute price, income, dietary fat concerns, generic milk advertising 
expenditures, competing beverage advertising expenditure and seasonality. The results of 
the study indicated that generic milk advertising had a positive and significant impact in 
all but one market. Advertising had the largest impact on per capita milk demand in 
Buffalo, followed closely by New York City. 
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 Hill et al. (1999) analyzed the profitability of incremental generic promotion 
expenditure by Australian Dairy Farmers, using an equilibrium displacement model. 
Simulation results show that 1% increase in domestic dairy promotion expenditure would 
result in a 0.002% increase in price of raw milk and in quantity supplied a 0.004% 
increase in dairy revenue and in producer surplus but a 0.018% decrease in net profits. 
Similarly, the authors reported that a 1% increase in dairy promotion expenditure on the 
export market would result in only very small increases in price and quantity (hence, 
revenue) for raw milk and net profits to dairy farmers would be reduced. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODEL SELECTION 
 
This study estimates a source-differentiated demand for U.S. whey, cheese, and 
NFDM in selected countries, using different demand specifications. These specifications 
are based on the multistage budgeting approach (Barten, 1977) in a consumer demand 
system. This approach is based on the premise that a country’s income at the first stage is 
allocated between imported and domestic goods while at the next stage, allocation of total 
expenditure on imports is made among all imported goods. Next, total expenditure for a 
particular imported product is allocated among the different sources of supplies. 
Underlying the Rotterdam model is viewing the demand theory as a budget sharing 
process for the consumer, and marginal shares are assumed to be constant. Developed by 
Theil (1965) and Barten (1964), it is formulated in terms of logarithmic differentials and 
it satisfies the adding-up, homogeneity, and Slutsky symmetry conditions; and global 
concavity is satisfied if the estimated model is concave. 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980) has been one of the most widely used systems in demand analysis (Lariviere, 
Larue, and Chalfant, 2000; Boetel and Liu, 2003; Yang and Koo, 1994) due to its 
flexibility, theoretical plausibility, and ease of use. However, concavity is only satisfied 
locally, and not globally. Its derivation starts with the expenditure function, representing 
the Price Independent Generalized Logarithmic (PIGLOG) preference. Differentiating the 
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expenditure function by Shephard’s Lemma with respect to prices yields the budget 
share, which is a function of prices and utility (Yang and Koo, 1994) The functional 
forms of the two models’ income and price terms, and the dependent variable differ (Lee, 
Brown, and Seales, 1994), although some studies have specified the differential version 
of the AIDS, and also used the Stone’s price index in the Rotterdam model.  The AIDS 
have been augmented using promotion and seasonality variables (Boetel and Liu, 2003; 
Laviere, Bruno, and Chalfant, 2000; Piggott et al., 1996; Richards, Ispelen, and Kagan, 
1997). The Rotterdam model incorporating promotion and seasonality variables have also 
been reported in the literature (Seale, Sparks, and Buxton, 1992; Kinnucan et al., 1997). 
 The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) model was developed by Keller and van 
Driel (1985) of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. It is based on Working’s (1943) 
model and assumes the allocation of budget shares to each commodity group is a linear 
function of the log of income. The CBS has the income coefficients of AIDS, and the 
Rotterdam price coefficients. Just like with the AIDS and Rotterdam models, it has the 
adding-up, symmetry, and homogeneity conditions in terms of the coefficients only 
(Barten, 1993). It shares global concavity property with the Rotterdam model, but, unlike 
the Rotterdam model, it does not assume constant marginal shares. The National Bureau 
of Research (NBR) model is another hybrid model between the AIDS and Rotterdam 
models, and was developed by Neves (1987). It has the income coefficients of the 
Rotterdam model and the AIDS price coefficients. It can also satisfy the adding-up, 
symmetry, and homogeneity conditions (Barten, 1993). It assumes constant marginal 
shares and concavity is only satisfied locally, and not globally. The general model 
(Barten, 1993) is a differential version of the CBS, AIDS, NBR, and Rotterdam models in 
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which these four models are nested into one. Studies using the CBS, NBR, and general 
models have been reported in the literature (Schmitz and Seales, 2002; Barten, 1993). 
In this study, a nested test is first conducted to test among the AIDS, Rotterdam, 
CBS, and the NBR demand systems. This is used to determine which of the models is 
more appropriate or preferred for the U.S. cheese, whey, and NFDM import demand in 
select countries with export promotion expenditures as an important economic factor. In 
the absence of any of the four models being the preferred model, the general model is 
selected. Based on the separability tests results among the three dairy products in each of 
the selected countries (Mexico, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea), the models are 
specified for each commodity separately. Selected countries for the U.S. whey demand 
are: Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand; for U.S. cheese demand are: Mexico, South 
Korea, and Japan; and for U.S. NFDM demand are: Mexico, Thailand, and Japan. 
Imported products are assumed to be separable from domestic products; and 
cheese, whey, and NFDM are also assumed to be separable from the rest of dairy 
products in this study. Source differentiated import demand for cheese in Mexico is 
specified in a system comprising the U.S., EU, Uruguay, New Zealand, and ROW. A 
source differentiated import demand system for cheese in South Korea is specified, and 
the system includes the U.S., EU, Australia, New Zealand, and ROW. The import 
demand specification for cheese in Japan is specified in a system consisting of the U.S., 
EU, Australia, New Zealand, and ROW. Source differentiated import demand for whey in 
Mexico is specified in a system which includes the U.S., EU, and ROW. A source 
differentiated import demand system for whey in South Korea is specified, and the 
system included the U.S., EU, and ROW. The import demand specification for whey in 
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Thailand is specified in a system that consists of the U.S., EU, Australia, and ROW. The 
import demand specification for NFDM in Japan is specified in a system comprised of 
the U.S., EU, Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine, and ROW. Source differentiated import 
demand for NFDM in Mexico is specified in a system which includes the U.S., EU, 
Canada, New Zealand, and ROW. A source differentiated import demand system for 
NFDM in Thailand is specified, and the system includes the U.S., EU, Australia, New 
Zealand, and ROW. U.S. total promotion expenditures on each of these commodities will 
be incorporated into each specification. Advertising is believed to have carryover effects, 
that is, it affects sales of commodities beyond the initial impacts (Liu and Forker, 1988). 
Low-cost, mature, frequently purchased products have been reported by Clarke (1976) of 
exhibiting advertising carry over effects of between three and nine months. Lagging 
promotion expenditure by one quarter is incorporated into the model with a view to 
capturing the carry-over effects that are associated with promotion efforts. Spillover 
effects of promotion are captured through the effect of U.S. promotion expenditures on 
the demand for the competitors’ products in the system. U.S. promotion expenditures 
(current, and lag) are expected to have a positive effect on the demand for U.S. products, 
and a negative effect on the demand for the competitors’ products. 
 
Rotterdam Model  
The Rotterdam model is specified as a single commodity, one country at a time. The 
model incorporating U.S. whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditure and seasonality 
is specified as a source differentiated import demand for each of these products as 
follows: 
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(3.1)        )ln(lnln ij
j
ikjiikikikik pdQdqdw ∑++= πθα  
where subscripts i indicate goods (whey, cheese, or NFDM), and k and j indicate sources 
of supply; wik represents the import shares of product i from source k, qik represents the 
quantity of product i from source k; Qi is an index of total volume of consumption of i 
from all sources; pij represents nominal price of product i from supply source j , where j 
includes k; αik, θik, πik j are parameters for the intercepts, income, and price of the source 
differentiated goods respectively. 
 The shift variables (promotion and seasonality) are incorporated into αik as 
(3.2) d
d
ikdiikiikikik DAAd ∑+++= ϕτταα 22110 lnln  
where Ai1 represents current (quarter) U.S. total whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion 
expenditure (FAS and dairy industry) in the importing country; Ai2 represents U.S. total 
whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditure lagged one period (quarter), Dd 
represents seasonality due to the use of quarterly data, τik1 and τik2 represent current and 
lagged U.S. whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditures coefficients respectively, 
while φikd is the seasonality coefficient.  
dln qik = log (qit/qi, t-1); d ln pij = log (pit/pi, t-1);  
d ln Ait = log (Ait/Ai, t-1); d ln Ait-1 = log (Ait-1/Ai, t-2);   
ik iki
d lnQ= w d ln q∑ , the Divisia volume index. It can be interpreted as a 
third-order approximation to real expenditure on the commodity group. 
(3.3)  wik = (wik, t + wik, t-1)/2; is the average expenditure share for i from source k. 
Symmetry and homogeneity will be imposed (Kinnucan et al, 1997) as: 
(3.4)   ijkikj ππ =    (symmetry). 
47 
(3.5)   ∑ =j ikj 0π    (price homogeneity). 
Adding-up property 
 (3.6)   ,00∑ =i ikα    (intercept). 
(3.7)   ,0,0,0,0,1 21 ∑∑∑∑∑ ===== d idikiki ikjj ik ϕττπθ    
Elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.8)   
ik
ik
ik w
θη =   (expenditure elasticities). 
(3.9)   
ik
ik
ik w
πς =   (hicksian own price elasticities). 
(3.10)  
ik
ij
ij w
πς =   (hicksian cross price elasticities ). 
Marshallian  price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.11)  ε ik, = ik
ik
ik
w
θπ −  (own price elasticities). 
(3.12)  ε ij = ikijikij ww /)( θπ −  (cross price elasticities). 
Promotion elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.13)   
ik
ik
iA w
1τρ =   (current promotion elasticities). 
(3.14)  
ik
ik
iA w
2
1
τρ =   (lagged promotion elasticities). 
 
(3.15)  
ik
ikik
AT w
21 ττρ +=  (total promotion elasticities) 
 
48 
All elasticities are calculated at the mean values. Although total promotion expenditures 
is not included in the model as a variable, total promotion elasticities are calculated 
according to the formula reported by Kinnucan et al. (1997) 
. 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)  
The AIDS model is specified as a single commodity, one country at a time, 
augmented with promotion and seasonality. 
(3.16)   wik = αik + ∑j γikj ln (pij) + βik ln (E/P*) 
where subscripts i represent goods (whey, cheese, or NFDM), and k and j represent 
exporting countries, wik is the budget share of good i from source k; pij is the price of 
good i from source j (where j includes k); E is the group expenditure and P* is the price 
index, αik is an intercept form, γikj is the price coefficient of the source-differentiated 
good, and βik is the real expenditure coefficient.. 
P* is defined as: 
 
(3.17)       ∑∑∑∑∑ ++=
i k j
ikikj ppP ikiko )(ln2
1)(ln*)(ln γαα  
In order to linearize equations (3.16) and (3.17), the Stone’s price index is used as 
suggested by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980): 
 
(3.18)  ∑ ∑= )(ln*ln ikikk pWP i       
 
The use of wik as an independent variable in the Stone’s price and as a dependent variable 
in equation (3.18) may create a simultaneity bias. To avoid this, the Stone’s price index is 
specified using a lagged wik as suggested by Eales and Unnevehr (1988) and the prices 
used in computing the price index scaled by their mean values (as suggested by 
49 
LaFrance, 1998). Bringing equation (3.16) into differential form and replacing the 
differential form of the stone price index, d lnP* by ∑ ∑ )(ln ikikk pdWi , equation 
(3.16) can be expressed as: 
(3.19)  Qdpddw ikij
j
ikjikik ln)(ln βγα ++= ∑  
where dwik =  wik d ln pik + wik d ln qik  - wik d ln E 
and d ln E = d ln P + d ln Q 
Equation (3.19) can be written as expressed in Barten (1993): 
(3.20)  wik d ln qik = αik + (wik + βik) d ln Q + ∑ −+ ijijikikjikikj pdwww ln)( δγ  
 where δikj = 1 if k is equal to j; otherwise δikj = 0. 
As expressed in Barten (1993):  
(3.21)  βik = θik - wik and γikj = πikj + wik δikj + wik wij 
The incorporation of promotion variable, Ai, and seasonality due to the use of quarterly 
data as intercept shifters (Henneberry, Piewthongngan, and Qiang (1999) necessitate 
redefining the intercept term in equation (3.19) as:  
(3.22)  d
d
ikdiikiikikik DAdAd ∑+++= ϕτταα 22110 lnln  
where Ai1 is the current U.S. total whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditure (FAS 
and dairy industry) in the importing country, Ai2 represents U.S. total whey, cheese, or 
NFDM promotion expenditure lagged one period (quarter), D represents seasonality due 
to the use of quarterly data, τik1 and τik2 are the current and lagged U.S. total whey, cheese, 
or NFDM promotion expenditures promotion coefficients respectively, and φihd is the 
seasonality coefficient. 
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The following properties are to be imposed: 
 
(3.23)    )symmetry(ikjikj γγ =  
 
(3.24)    ∑ =
j
ikj 0γ (homogeneity) 
 
Adding-up: 
 
(3.25)  ,0,0,0,0,0,0 21ik0 ∑∑∑∑∑∑ ====== ikikikdi ikj ikj μμϕβγα  
 
Hicksian own and cross price elasticities are: 
(3.26)  
ik
ik
w
ikk
ikik
w++−= γς 1   (own-price elasticities) 
 
(3.27)  
ij
ik
w
ikj
ijik
w+= γς   (cross-price elasticities) 
 
The expenditure, promotion and Marshallian own and cross price elasticities are: 
 
(3.28)   
ik
ik
ik w
βη +=1    (expenditure elasticities) 
 
(3.29)   
ik
ik
w
ikk
ikik
βγε −+−= 1   (own-price elasticities) 
 
(3.30)   ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
ik
ij
ik
ikj
ijik W
W
w ik
βγε   (cross-price elasticities between the  
.                           same goods from different sources). 
 
Promotion elasticities are calculated as: 
 
(3.31)    
ik
ik
iA w
1τρ =    (current promotion elasticities) 
 
(3.32)  
ik
ik
iA w
2
1
τρ =    (lagged promotion elasticities) 
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All elasticities are calculated at the mean values. Although total promotion expenditures 
is not included in the model as a variable, total promotion elasticities are calculated by 
summing equations (3.31 and 3.32), according to the formula reported by Kinnucan et al. 
(1997). 
 
CBS Model  
The import demand for U.S whey, cheese, or NFDM is specified using the CBS model 
(Keller and Van Driel, 1985), augmented with promotion and seasonality variables, and 
is specified as a single commodity, one country at a time as shown below:  
(3.33)          )ln(ln)lnln( ij
j
ikjiikikiikik pdQdQdqdw ∑++=− πβα  
where subscripts i indicate goods (whey, cheese, or NFDM), and k and j indicate sources 
of supply; wik represents the import shares of product i from source k, qik represents the 
quantity of product i from source k; Qi is an index of total volume of consumption of i 
from all sources; pij represents nominal price of product i from supply source j , where j 
includes k; αik, θik, πik j are parameters for the intercepts, income, and price of the source 
differentiated goods respectively. The CBS model is a hybrid model between the AIDS 
and Rotterdam models, and it has the Rotterdam price coefficients, and the income 
coefficients of AIDS. In the Rotterdam model, the demand parameters, θik, πikj are 
assumed to be constant, but there are no strong prior reasons that this should be so. Based 
on Working’s Engel model, an alternative parameterization could be specified as: 
(3.34)                                    wik = αik + βik log E 
Here ∑ =i ik ;1α  ;0∑ =i ikβ To derive the marginal share, multiply equation (3.34) by E 
and then differentiate with respect to E to obtain: 
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(3.35)  (∂ pik qik/ ∂E) = αik + βik (1+ log E) = wik + βik  
From equation (3.35), ikth marginal share differs from the corresponding budget share by 
βik, as the budget share with respect to income and the associated marginal shares are not 
constant. 
Equation (3.33) is obtained by substituting equation (3.35) for θik in equation (3.1) where 
θik, πikj are constant coefficients.      
The shift variables (promotion and seasonality) are incorporated into αik as 
(3.36)  d
d
ikdiikiikikik DAAd ∑+++= ϕτταα 22110 lnln  
where Ai1 represents current U.S. total whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditure 
(FAS and dairy industry) in the importing country; Ai2 represents U.S. total whey, cheese, 
or NFDM promotion expenditure lagged one period (quarter), Dd represents seasonality 
due to the use of quarterly data, τik1 and τik2 represent current and lagged U.S. whey, 
cheese, and NFDM promotion expenditures coefficients respectively, while φikd is the 
seasonality coefficient.   
Theoretical restrictions are imposed as: 
Adding-up:  
(3.37)  ;00∑ =i ikα ,0,0,0,0,0 21 ∑∑∑∑∑ ===== d idikiki ikjj ik ϕττπβ  
(3.38)  ijkikj ππ =              (symmetry) 
(3.39)          ∑ =j ikj 0π       (price homogeneity  
 
The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the expression (Barten, 1993): 
(3.40)                               ηik = 1+ βik /wik   or   ηik = θik /wik            
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Hicksian price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.41)   
ik
ik
ik w
πς =   (own price elasticities). 
(3.42)  
ik
ij
ij w
πς =   (cross price elasticities from different sources). 
 
Marshallian price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.43)  ε ik, = )( ikik
ik
ik w
w
βπ +−    (own price elasticities). 
(3.44)  ε ij = ikijikij ww /)( βπ − - wij  (cross price elasticities). 
Promotion elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.45)   
ik
ik
iA w
1τρ =   (current promotion elasticities). 
(3.46)  
ik
ik
iA w
2
1
τρ =   (lagged promotion elasticities). 
 
All elasticities are calculated at the mean values. Although total promotion expenditures 
is not included in the model as a variable, total promotion elasticities are calculated by 
summing equations (3.45 and 3.46), according the formula reported by Kinnucan et al. 
(1997). 
 
NBR Model  
The NBR model (Neves, 1987), augmented with promotion and seasonality variables, 
and is specified for each commodity, and one country at a time as shown below:  
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(3.47)            d wik+ wik  d ln Q  = αik + θik d lnQ  + ∑ ijikj pd lnγ  
 
According to Barten (1993), equation (3.47) can be re-written as: 
(3.48) wik d ln qik  = αik + θ ik d ln Q  + ∑ −+ ijijikikjikikj pdwww ln)( δγ  
where subscripts i represent goods (whey, cheese, or NFDM), and k and j represent 
exporting countries (j includes k), wik is the budget share of good i from source k; pij is the 
price of good i from source j. 
Equation (3.47) is obtained by replacing the income coefficient βik in equation (3.19) by 
θik - wik. The NBR model has the price coefficients of AIDS and the Rotterdam income 
coefficients. 
The shift variables (promotion and seasonality) are incorporated into αih as 
(3.49)  d
d
ikdiikiikikik DAdAd ∑+++= ϕτταα 22110 lnln  
where Ai1 represents current U.S. total whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditure 
(FAS and dairy industry) in the importing country; Ai2 represents U.S. total whey, cheese, 
or NFDM promotion expenditure lagged one period (quarter), Dd represents seasonality 
due to the use of quarterly data, τik1 and τik2 represent current and lagged U.S. whey, 
cheese, and NFDM promotion expenditures coefficients respectively, while φikd is the 
seasonality coefficient.  
 
Theoretical restrictions are imposed as:  
(3.50) ;00∑ =i ikα ,0,0,0,0,1 21 ∑∑∑∑∑ ===== d ikdikiki ikjik ϕττγθ (adding-up) 
(3.51)  ikjikj γγ =              (symmetry) 
(3.52)          ∑ =0ikjγ       (price homogeneity  
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The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the expression (Barten, 1993): 
(3.53)                               ηik =   θik /wik    
 
Hicksian price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.54)   ik
ik
ikk
ik ww
++−= γς 1   (own price elasticities). 
(3.55)  ij
ik
ikj
ij ww
+= γς  (cross price elasticities from different sources). 
Marshallian price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.56)  ε ik, = -1 + ik
ik
ikk
w
θγ −   (own price elasticities). 
(3.57)  ε ij, =  ij
ik
ijikikj w
w
w +−θγ  (cross price elasticities). 
 
Promotion elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.58)   
ik
ik
iA w
1τρ =   (current promotion elasticities). 
(3.59)  
ik
ik
iA w
2
1
τρ =   (lagged promotion elasticities). 
 
All elasticities are calculated at the mean values. Although total promotion expenditures 
is not included in the model as a variable, total promotion elasticities are calculated  by 
summing equations (3.58 and 3.59), according to the formula reported by Kinnucan et al. 
(1997). 
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General Model 
The general model (Schmitz and Seales, 2002) incorporating U.S. cheese promotion 
expenditure and seasonality is specified as an import demand as follows: 
 (3.60)   )ln()]([ln)(ln 21 ij
j
ijikjikikjiikikikikik pdwwQdwqdw ∑ −+Χ+++= δσσκα  
where subscripts i indicate goods (whey, cheese, or NFDM), and k and j indicate sources 
of supply; wik represents the import shares of product i from source k, qik represents the 
quantity of product i from source k; Qi is an index of total volume of consumption of i 
from all sources; σ1, and σ2 are expenditure and price nesting parameters respectively, 
which are to be estimated; кik and Χik j represent the expenditure and price coefficients 
respectively. 
(3.61)   кik =  σ1 βik + (1 - σ1) θik; Χik j = (1+ σ2) πik ij - σ2 γik ij 
Re-writing equation (3.60) results in:    
(3.62) )lnln(lnlnlnln 21 PdpdwpdQdwQdqdw ik
j
ikijikjiikiikikikik −+Χ+++= ∑ σσκα
4Equation (3.62) is AIDS model if σ1 = 1 and σ2 = -1; 
5Equation (3.62) is CBS model if σ1 = 1 and σ2 = 0; 
6Equation (3.62) is NBR model if σ1 = 0 and σ2 = -1; 
7Equation (3.62) is Rotterdam model if σ1 = 0 and σ2 = 0; 
The shift variables (promotion and seasonality) are incorporated into αik as 
(3.63)  d
d
ikdiikiikikik DAdAd ∑+++= ϕτταα 22110 lnln  
                                                 
4 wik (dlnqik + dlnpik – dlnE) = αik + ∑ кik dlnQi + ∑ Xik j dlnpij where dwik = dlnqik + dlnpik – dlnE, and  
dlnE = dlnP+dlnQ 
5 wik (dlnqik + dlnQi ) = αik + ∑ кik dlnQi + ∑ Xik j dlnpij 
6 wik (dlnqik + dlnpik – dlnP) = αik + ∑ кik dlnQi + ∑ Xik j dlnpij where dwik and dlnE are as in 4 above. 
7 wik dlnqik  = αik + ∑ кik dlnQi + ∑ Xik j dlnpij 
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where Ai1 represents current U.S. total whey, cheese, or NFDM promotion expenditure 
(FAS and dairy industry) in the importing country; Ai2 represents U.S. total whey, cheese, 
or NFDM promotion expenditure lagged one period (quarter), Dd represents seasonality 
due to the use of quarterly data, τik1 and τik2 represent current and lagged U.S. whey, 
cheese, and NFDM promotion expenditures coefficients respectively, while φikd is the 
seasonality coefficient.                             
Theoretical restrictions are imposed as:  
Adding-up: 
(3.64) 
 ;00∑ =i ikα ,0,0,0,0,1 211 ∑∑∑∑∑ ====Χ−= d ikdikiki ikjj ikk ϕττσ  
(3.65)  ijkikj Χ=Χ              (symmetry) 
(3.66)          ∑ =Χj ikj 0      (price homogeneity)  
The expenditure elasticity is calculated using the expression (Barten, 1993): 
(3.67)                               ηik = kik /wik + σ 1 or   ηik = θik /wik            
Hicksian price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.68)   )1(2 ik
ik
ik
ik ww
−+Χ= σς   (own price elasticities). 
(3.69)  ij
ik
ij
ij ww 2
σς −Χ=     (cross price elasticities). 
Marshallian price elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.70)  )( 212 σσσε +−+−Χ= ikik
ik
ik
ik wkw
  (own price elasticities). 
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(3.71)  )(
)(
21 σσ +−−Χ= ij
ik
ikijij
ij ww
kw
E   (cross price elasticities). 
Promotion elasticities are calculated as: 
(3.72)   
ik
ik
iA w
1τρ =   (current promotion elasticities). 
(3.73)  
ik
ik
iA w
2
1
τρ =   (lagged promotion elasticities) 
 
All elasticities are calculated at the mean values. Although total promotion expenditures 
is not included in the model as a variable, total promotion elasticities are calculated  by 
summing equations (3.72 and 3.73), according to the formula reported by Kinnucan et al. 
(1997). 
 
Data 
 
For the trade values, quarterly data from quarter 1 of 1998 to quarter 4 of 2005 
(32 observations) collected from the USDA-FAS are used in these studies. The 
Harmonized System (HS) codes for the dairy products used in this study are HS 0406 for 
cheese (consists of cheese and curd), HS 040410 for whey (consists of all whey 
products), and HS 040210 for NFDM (consists of milk powder less than 1.5 percent fat). 
Raw data on various dairy products promotion expenditures were collected from the 
USDA-FAS on an annual basis. Although data provided was from 1995 to 2005, 
promotion expenditures by dairy products and by country started in 1998 under MAP and 
in 2000 under FMDP. Based on this, the period of study is from 1998 to 2005. However, 
for MAP, FY 2005 was excluded from this study because it was still an open year and 
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expenditure was still inconclusive when data was provided by USDA-FAS. Due to few 
observations of annual promotion expenditures the “EXPAND”8 procedure, with a 
“JOIN” option in SAS was used to expand promotion expenditures from annual to 
quarterly basis, thereby resulting in 32 observations. The same procedure was applied to 
the USDEC dairy promotion expenditures. Total dairy promotion expenditures for 
selected dairy products (NFDM, cheese, and whey) used in this study consists of the FAS 
(MAP and FMDP) and the USDEC expenditure. The USDEC promotion expenditure for 
Thailand was not available, and the expenditure for South East Asia is used as the 
industry’s export promotion expenditures in Thailand.  
 Dairy products used in this study were selected based on the amount of 
expenditures devoted to market development. Hence, the top three largest recipients of 
FAS promotion expenditures, cheese, whey and NFDM were selected. For the 
years/period without promotion expenditures a small value was incorporated (0.0001) to 
take care of the logarithm component of the model used. The U.S. is included in all of the 
estimations as a supplier because the focus of this study has to do with the impact of U.S. 
promotion expenditure. However, for other suppliers of the commodities investigated, the 
criterion for selection is based on a country supplying 10 percent of total imports.  
 Trade values and dairy expenditures’ data provided are in dollar terms. These are 
however converted to importing countries local currencies using the exchange rate: the 
                                                 
8 The EXPAND procedure converts time series from one sampling interval or frequency to another. PROC 
EXPAND can collapse time series data from higher frequency intervals to lower frequency intervals, or 
expand data from lower frequency intervals to higher frequency intervals. By default, the EXPAND 
procedure fits cubic spline curves to the nonmissing values of variables to form continuous-time 
approximations of the input series. Output series are then generated from the spline approximations. 
Several alternate conversion methods are available. The JOIN method fits a continuous curve to the data by 
connecting successive straight line segments, and this produces a linear spline (SAS, 2003). 
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Japanese Yen, Mexican Pesos, Thai Baht, and the South Korean Won. Unit values of 
imported products are used for these studies by diving total import value by total import 
quantity. There were no trade data in some quarters, thereby resulting in missing price 
data.  However, in some instances, data were available for import values while zero was 
recorded for import quantities; this probably is due to small import quantities. Several 
methods have been used in the literature to account for missing price data that results 
from zero expenditure on a good. Meyerhoeffer, Ranney, and Sahn (2005) used the 
monthly National Tobacco CPI as a proxy for tobacco price when there were no 
purchases. According to Heien and Pompelli (1988), expenditure is zero and the budget 
share undefined if households do not consume. In their study on the demand for beef 
products, they assume that zero quantity consumed is consistent with a continuous 
demand curve (Wales and Woodland, 1983). While agreeing that dichotomous logit 
models are usually used to treat the decisions to consume or not, they assumed a 
multivariate normal assumption, and used the AIDS model because more than 80 percent 
of the shares are non zero. Weliwita, Nyange, and Tsujii (2003) replaced zero units in 
their study by the cluster averages of non zero unit values. 
 In this study, for the Mexican data set, out of 96 observations there is only one 
zero consumption; of the 160 observations in the NFDM dataset, there is only one zero 
consumption (in terms of quantity, but there are data on expenditure). Thailand has four 
zero consumptions out of 160 observations in the NFDM dataset. Japan has the most zero 
observations, as there are 11 out of the 192 observations in the NFDM dataset. Of these 
11 zero observations, four have expenditure data while quantity is recorded as zero. 
Heien and Pompelli (1988) estimated missing price data by regressing non-missing 
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observations on income and region. In this study, an average of non zero unit prices for 
the quarters in the year is used as a proxy for missing unit prices Data used for exchange 
rates are from various issues of the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. 
Quarterly dummy variable for seasonality is included in the models used. 
 
Test for symmetric weak separability and Model Selection 
For each country, a test in conducted to determine if the dairy products being 
investigated can be estimated separately. Each product with its sources of supply 
represents a group. For Thailand, there are two groups (whey and NFDM), Mexico has 
three groups (cheese, whey, and NFDM), South Korea has two groups (cheese and 
whey), while Japan has two groups consisting of cheese and NFDM. As suggested by 
Moshini, Moro, and Green (1994), a symmetric weak separability test is conducted using 
the general model and imposing restrictions, as suggested by Eales and Wessels (1999): 
(3.74) Χik, hj = ,)(
)(
)(
22
1
1 σσσκ
σκ
hjikhjiqhjiq
iqiq
ikik wwww
w
w +−Χ+
+
 for ik, iq A∈  and hj ∈B  
where A and B represents dairy products.    
For Thailand, the model has total restrictions of 19; South Korea has 14; and Japan has 
29. The restrictions for Rotterdam model was specified as σ1 = 0 and σ2 = 0, and this was 
used for separability test for Thailand, while the general model was used for Japan and 
South Korea. The Likelihood ratio test is used to conduct the test and the results are 
presented in Table 17. However the test for Mexico is inconclusive due to the problem of 
insufficient degrees of freedom. The results show that separability is not rejected and this 
is also assumed for the Mexican import demand system in this study.  
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 Model selection test is done twice in this study. Firstly, it is carried out before 
conducting the separability test, to determine which model is appropriate for the 
separability test, and the result is presented in Table 16. With the exception of Thailand, 
the result shows that the general model is appropriate for conducting the weak 
separability test in South Korea and Japan, while the Rotterdam model is used for 
Thailand. Secondly, based on the results of the weak separability test, a model selection 
test is conducted to determine which model is appropriate for the import demand system 
in each of these countries, for each of the commodities. The results are presented in Table 
18. 
 There are four (4) separate import demand systems for cheese, using the CBS 
model for Mexico, CBS and Rotterdam models for South Korea, the Rotterdam model for 
Japan). Four whey import demand systems are also estimated, using the CBS and 
Rotterdam models for Mexico, the CBS model for South Korea, and the Rotterdam 
model for Thailand. The Rotterdam model was used in estimating the three (3) separate 
import demand systems in Mexico, Thailand, and Japan. The one (1) percent significance 
level was used in selecting the appropriate model. However, where more than one model 
is appropriate for a particular commodity, two models are selected at the 10 percent 
significance level. The CBS model is used in estimating the Mexican whey import 
demand system because its p-value (0.093) is closer to the 10 percent significance level 
than to the five (5) percent significance level (Table 18). These specifications are for one 
each commodity, and one country at a time, and augmented with the dairy product U.S. 
total promotion expenditure. 
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Estimation Procedure and Misspecification Test 
The iterative seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR) method is used in estimating the 
models used, with symmetry and homogeneity imposed. One equation is omitted in the 
system during estimation due to the adding-up conditions which results in singularity of 
the contemporaneous covariance matrix. Parameter estimates for the dropped equation is 
estimated by dropping another equation and then the system is re-estimated.  
The joint conditional mean test (no autocorrelation, appropriateness of functional form 
and the stability of the parameters), and the joint conditional variance test (static 
homoskedasticity, dynamic homoskedasticity, and stability of the variance), and test of 
normality of the error terms are conducted using the misspecification tests as suggested 
by McGuirk et al (1995). The results are presented in Tables 19, 20, and 21 and shows 
that the assumptions of normality of error terms cannot be rejected at the one (1) percent 
significance level for the NFDM and cheese import demand systems (Tables 20, and 21), 
and in all cases for the whey demand systems, except for whey imported into Thailand 
from ROW (Table 19). Assumption of normality was rejected at the one percent level for 
whey imported into Thailand from ROW (Table 20). 
 Misspecification results for whey import demand in Mexico, Thailand and South 
Korea are presented in Table 19. The overall joint test for the joint conditional mean in 
the whey demand systems in Mexico and Thailand shows that the null hypothesis of 
parameter stability, linear functional form and no autocorrelation are not rejected at the 
10 percent significance level. However, the South Korean whey import demand is re-
estimated by correcting for autocorrelation. The null hypotheses of the joint conditional 
variance in all the whey import demand systems are not rejected at the 10% significance 
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level (Table 19). Results of the joint conditional means tests for cheese import demand in 
South Korea and Japan indicates that the null hypothesis for parameter stability, linear 
functional form, and no autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level, while it 
was rejected in the Mexican demand system. The cheese import demand system in 
Mexico is re-estimated by correcting for autocorrelation. The results of the, joint 
conditional variance for the cheese demand system suggest that the null hypothesis of 
variance stability, static and dynamic homoskedasticity cannot be rejected at the 10 
percent significance level(Table 20). All the null hypotheses for the joint conditional 
mean and variance in the NFDM demand systems are rejected at the one percent 
significance level, except for the overall joint test of the joint conditional mean in the 
Mexican and Japanese NFDM demand systems (Table 21). Nonetheless, all the NFDM 
import demand systems are re-estimated by correcting for autocorrelation in demand 
systems in Japan and Thailand, and for static heteroskedasticity in Mexico, using the 
Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator (HCCME). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Discussions of results focus on elasticities and marginal returns to promotion 
expenditures. 
Cheese  
Mexico 
 
Parameter Estimates 
The parameter estimates of cheese import demand in Mexico are presented in Tables 22.  
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
Tables 26 and 27 represent the estimated elasticities for cheese import demand in 
Mexico. The Hicksian (compensated) price elasticities is an indication of percentage 
response in quantities demanded as a result of a one percent change in price, holding real 
expenditures on imported cheese constant. The Marshallian (uncompensated) price 
elasticities indicate the percentage response in quantities demanded as a result of a one 
percent change in price, holding nominal expenditures on imported cheese constant; thus, 
it measures both substitution and income effects. The Marshallian elasticities estimates 
are more negative than the corresponding Hicksians because they are affected by price 
and real income effects (Schmitz and Seale, Jr., 2002). In the Mexican cheese import 
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demand system, all own-price elasticities (Marshallian and Hicksian) have negative signs 
and are consistent with economic theory. Marshallian elasticities and Hicksian elasticities 
own price elasticities are significant at the one percent level for cheese imported from the 
U.S. and ROW. Marshallian elasticities own price elasticities are significant at the 10 
percent level for cheese imported from New Zealand, and at the five percent level for the 
Hicksian elasticities. All the Marshallian own-price elasticities are greater than one in 
absolute value, except for the EU own price (Tables 26). All but the U.S. and EU  
Hicksian own price elasticities are greater than one in absolute value (Tables 27), 
indicating an elastic own-price response. The Hicksian own-price elasticities indicate that 
a one percent increase in own-price of cheese would reduce import demand for U.S. 
cheese in Mexico by 0.85%, and those of New Zealand, and ROW by 2.37% and 1.43% 
respectively. The U.S. cheese exporters therefore stand to have increased total revenue 
with a small increased in cheese price, compared to New Zealand, and ROW. 
 Eleven out of the 20 Marshallian cross price elasticities have positive signs, 
indicating substitutability relationships among cheese from different sources while nine 
(9) are complementary to each other. Cross price elasticity of cheese from country j with 
respect to cheese from country k indicates a percentage response in the quantity 
demanded of cheese from country j in response to a one percent change in the price of 
cheese from country k. A positive cross price elasticity indicates a percentage increase in 
the quantity demanded of cheese from country j in response to a one percent increase in 
the price of cheese from country k; while a  negative cross price elasticity indicates a 
percentage increase in the quantity demanded of cheese from country j in response to a 
one percent decrease in the price of cheese from country k. Cheese from the EU cheese is 
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a significant substitute to ROW cheese at the 10 percent significance level while the New 
Zealand is a significant substitute in Mexico to those from Uruguay (Table 26). Fourteen 
of the 20 Hicksian cross price elasticities are substitutes to each other; with four (4) being 
significant (at one percent level) while six (6) are insignificant complements to each 
other. Significant substitutability relationships are shown between the EU cheese and 
ROW cheese; and also between cheese imported from Uruguay and New Zealand into 
Mexico (Table 27).  
Expenditure elasticities are positive and significant at the one percent level for the 
U.S., EU and Australia; and at five percent level for ROW. Uruguay stands to benefit 
most from an increase in allocation of expenditure to cheese in Mexico. Although New 
Zealand has the highest elastic own price elasticity, its expenditure elasticity is not 
significantly different from zero. While Uruguay and the EU have the most elastic 
expenditure elasticities, their own price elasticities are not significantly different from 
zero. Although both the U.S and ROW expenditure elasticities are less than one in 
absolute value, ROW’s expenditure elasticity is slightly higher than that of the US and its 
own-price elasticity more elastic than that of the U.S. (Table 27). The implication of this 
result is that if the expenditure on imported cheese in Mexico were to increase, more of 
the expenditures would be spent on cheese imported from Uruguay and the EU. 
However, if there is a decrease in the Mexican expenditure on imported cheese, a greater 
portion of their budget on imported cheese would be spent on the U.S. cheese. 
The U.S. cheese promotion (current and lag) did not significantly increase import 
demand for cheese in Mexico (Table 27). In line with expectations, U.S. current export 
promotion expenditure on cheese increased demand for cheese imported from the U.S., 
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but contrary to expectations, its effect was also positive on the demand for cheese from 
the EU in Mexico. It however has negative effects on cheese imported from Uruguay, 
New Zealand and ROW, as expected. Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) reported similarly 
on the U.S. walnut export promotion in the European Union was not significantly 
different from zero. The U.S. export promotion expenditure on cheese in Mexico has an 
insignificant positive spillover effects on sales of other competing suppliers of cheese 
(EU for current promotion expenditures, and other suppliers when promotion is lagged). 
Spillover promotion effects occurred in this study as U.S. competitors’ benefit from the 
promotion efforts on cheese by the U.S in Mexico. Richards, Van Ispelen, and Kagan 
(1997) also reported spillover promotion effects of U.S. apple export promotion to sales 
of U.S. competitors in Singapore and the United Kingdom. However, total cheese 
promotion has an insignificant positive effect on only the U.S. sales in Mexico and 
negative but insignificant effects on the cheese sales of U.S. competitors (Table 27).  
Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable for the Mexican cheese 
import demand system are presented in Table 26. Seasonality has no significant effects 
on the import demand for cheese in Mexico. 
 
South Korea 
Results of both the CBS and Rotterdam are presented since the model selection test was 
unable to reject the two specifications. 
69 
Parameter Estimates 
The parameter estimates of cheese import demand in South Korea are presented in Tables 
23 and 24. 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
Tables 28 to 31 represent the estimated elasticities for cheese import demand in South 
Korea, and shows negative and significant own-price elasticities for the U.S, EU and 
Australian cheese in South Korea. Own-price elasticities are consisted with economic 
theory. The CBS and Rotterdam models yield similar results with a few differences in 
significance levels. While the EU Marshallian own-price elasticities are significant at the 
five percent level for the CBS model, they are significant at the one percent level for the 
Rotterdam model (Tables 28 and 30). The Marshallian and Hicksian own-price 
elasticities of the EU, and Australia cheese are greater than one in absolute value, 
indicating an elastic own-price response; while those of the US (except for the Rotterdam 
Hicksian) are also close to one in absolute value. The Rotterdam Hicksian own-price 
elasticities indicate that a one percent increase in own-price of cheese would reduce 
import demand for U.S. cheese in South Korea by 0.86%, and those of the EU, and 
Australia by 1.77% and 1.32% respectively. The U.S. cheese exporters would therefore 
benefit from an increase in total revenue with a small increased in cheese price, compared 
to the EU, and ROW cheese exporters. Of the CBS 20 cross price elasticities, 14 are 
substitutes to each other, with one of the Marshallian elasticities being significant at the 
ten percent level and two of the Hicksian elasticities (EU and Australian cheese) 
significant at the five percent level. There are six insignificant complementary 
relationships among cheese from different sources (Tables 28 and 29). Fourteen of the 
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Rotterdam Marshallian cross price elasticities is positive with two (2) being significant 
(between EU and Australia). There are two (2) insignificant complementary relationships 
among the six (6) negative cross price elasticities (Table 30). The Rotterdam Hicksian 
cross price elasticities in the South Korean import demand system has 16 substitutability 
relationships (four are significant at five and ten percent levels) and four (4) insignificant 
complementary relationships (Table 31).  
Expenditure elasticities are all positive; significant at the ten percent for the U.S.; 
at the one percent for the EU, Australia and New Zealand using CBS and Rotterdam 
model; and significant at ten percent level for ROW using the CBS model (Tables 29 and 
31). While other supplying countries expenditure elasticities are greater than 1 in absolute 
value, those of the U.S. are less than one. A one percent increase in the expenditure on 
imported cheese in South Korea would result in a greater than one percent increase in the 
shares on U.S. competitors’ cheese while the U.S. cheese exporters’ shares of the 
increased imported expenditure would be less than one percent.  
Contrary to expectations, U.S. cheese export promotion expenditure results in a 
negative effect on US export sales in South Korea and this effect is highly significant (at 
one percent) for lagged expenditure. However, total promotion expenditure effect on the 
U.S. cheese demand in South Korea is not significantly different from zero, although, 
effect is negative (Tables 29 and 31). This suggests that a one percent increase in U.S. 
cheese promotion expenditures results in a 0.14% and 0.16% decrease in the demand for 
U.S. cheese in South Korea, using the CBS and Rotterdam models respectively. In other 
words, a one percent decrease in U.S. cheese promotion expenditures results in a 0.14% 
and 0.16% increase in the demand for U.S. cheese in South Korea, using the CBS and 
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Rotterdam models respectively. Total U.S. cheese promotion expenditures in South 
Korea appear to have been on the decrease from 1998 to 2005 (Table 9) while cheese 
import demand has been on the increase (Table12). Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) 
reported similarly on the U.S. walnut export promotion in the Asia with walnut exports 
trending up while walnut promotion expenditures trended down; and also for Almonds in 
Asia (Onunkwo and Epperson, 2001). The EU benefited from cheese promotion efforts in 
South Korea with a significant positive lag and total promotion elasticity at the ten and 
five percent levels respectively, using the CBS model and positive significant total 
promotion elasticity at the ten percent level using the Rotterdam model. The U.S. 
promotion expenditure on cheese in South Korea significantly reduced the import 
demand for ROW cheese at five percent for current promotion expenditure and at 10 
percent for total promotion expenditure (Tables 29 and 31). 
 
Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable in the South Korean cheese 
import market are presented in Table 28 and 30. Demand for cheese imported from 
Australia were significantly higher in the quarters II and IV, and lower in Quarter III; for 
New Zealand cheese in quarter IV, compared to the first quarter. However, with the CBS 
cheese model, seasonality effects on Australian cheese are not significant in the third 
quarter. In South Korea, drinking milk accounts for 75 percent of milk production while 
processing accounts for the remaining 25 percent (Austrade, 2007). Production of raw 
milk is high from winter to spring, while market demand is high in spring and autumn. 
Demand for cheese imports are expected to rise in spring and autumn, that is, second and 
fourth quarters; and to decline in the first quarter.  
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Japan 
Parameter estimates 
The parameter estimates of cheese import demand in Japan are presented in Tables 25. 
 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
Estimated elasticities for the Japanese cheese Import demand using Rotterdam 
model are presented in Tables 32 and 33. All own price elasticities are consistent with 
economic theory and are significant at the one percent level for the U.S. and New 
Zealand own price; at the 10 percent level for Australia, and greater than one in absolute 
values. This is in contrast to results obtained by Christou et al. (2006); and Washington 
and Kilmer (2001) where the U.S cheese own-price in Japan exhibited an inelastic 
response However; the U.S. own-price elasticitity is less responsive than those of New 
Zealand, and Australia. A one percent increase in Hicksian own price would reduce result 
in a 1.67% decrease in import demand for U.S. cheese in Japan; and a decrease of 2.38%, 
and 2.03% in import demand for cheese from New Zealand, and Australia (Table 33). 
Out of the 20 cross price elasticities, eight (8) of the Marshallian elasticities are positive 
(with two being significant at five percent level and two (2) at 10 percent level) 
exhibiting substitutability relationships among cheese imported from different sources. 
There are 12 Marshallian negative insignificant cross price elasticities (Table 32). Ten of 
the Hicksian cross price elasticities are negative (6 are significant) while 10 are 
insignificant complements to each other. There is significant substitutability between the 
US and Australian cheese; Australian and ROW cheese at the 10 percent level; and 
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between Australia and New Zealand cheese at the five percent level (Table 33). While a 
one percent increase in the price of U.S. cheese would result in a 0.3% increase in the 
import demand for cheese from Australia; a one percent increase in the price of cheese 
from Australia would lead to a 2.26% increase in the demand for cheese from the U.S. in 
Japan.  
All expenditure elasticities are positive, significant for all other competing 
suppliers (at one percent level) but insignificant for the U.S., with Australia, having the 
most elastic own-price and expenditure elasticities (Table 33). Australia would therefore 
likely to benefit more in the event of an increase in Expenditures on imported cheese in 
Japan. Effect of U.S. export promotion expenditure is only significant for ROW at five 
percent level. Lagging promotion by one period will increase the demand for ROW 
cheese in Japan significantly. Although current and total promotion expenditure increases 
the import demand for U.S. cheese in Japan, effect is not significant (Table 33). The 
effect of U.S promotion expenditures on the import demand for U.S. cheese in Japan is 
not significantly different from zero. Ineffective allocation of funds to promotion 
activities by the U.S. in Japan or low levels of promotion expenditures may account for 
the .insignificant impact of U.S cheese promotion expenditures. Insignificant promotion 
effects of walnut in the EU have been reported by Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b), 
suggesting a no-responsiveness to promotion efforts in a mature market. Spillover effects 
of U.S. apple promotion effects on competitors’ sale were reported by Richards, Van 
Ispelen, and Kagan (1997) in Singapore, and the United Kingdom.  
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Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable for the Japanese cheese 
import demand system are presented in Table 32. Demand for cheese imported from the 
EU are significantly higher in quarters II, III, and IV, compared to the first quarter, while 
seasonality effects in quarters II,and IV are negative on the demand for cheese from 
Australia.Japan utilities over 80 percent of its milk production as fluid milk while 20 
percent is processed (Campo and Beghin, 2005). Japan has a school milk program but 
school children attends school for a major part of each quarter, with the longest school 
break between end of July and end of August. Import of cheese is assumed to increase in 
all quarters.  
 
Whey 
Mexico 
The model selection test was unable to reject the CBS and Rotterdam models; therefore 
the results of both specifications are presented. 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter estimates of the import demand for whey in Mexico are presented in Tables 
34, and 35. 
 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
 Estimated elasticities for whey import demand in Mexico are shown in Table 38, 
39, 40, and 41. Results obtained from the CBS and Rotterdam models are similar except 
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for some differences in significance levels. The two models show that the Marshallian 
own price elasticities for the U.S. and ROW are negative (consistent with economic 
theory) and significant (at the one percent level) while they are positive but insignificant 
at the 10 percent level for the EU (Tables 38 and 40). Own price and expenditure 
elasticities for ROW are highly elastic while they are inelastic for the U.S. The Hicksian 
own-price elasticities indicate that a one percent increase in own-price of whey would 
reduce import demand for U.S. whey in Mexico by 0.14%; and those of ROW by 1.36% 
under the CBS specification (Table 39), and by1.45% under the Rotterdam specification 
(Table 41). The U.S. whey exporters would therefore benefit from increased total revenue 
with a small increase in whey price, compared to their ROW counterparts. The U.S. whey 
and whey from ROW are significant substitutes to each at one percent level (Tables 39 
and 41). An attempt by the U.S. whey exporters to increase total whey import revenue by 
increasing own-price by one percent would increase the demand for ROW whey by about 
1.8%.  Whey imports from the EU and ROW have significant negative cross-price 
elasticities at the 10 percent level, using the CBS model (Table 39) while these are not 
significant under the Rotterdam specification (Table 41).  
 Expenditure elasticities are positive and significant at the one percent level in the 
U.S. and ROW equations but negative and insignificant (at 10 percent level) for the EU. 
While a one percent increase in whey imports expenditures in Mexico would result in 
about 0.88% increase in the demand for U.S. whey; demand for whey from ROW would 
increase by over 4%. ROW whey exporters are likely to benefit from an increase in 
Mexican income. Effects of U.S. whey promotion expenditures are not significant at the 
10 percent level although they are positive (for the current period and total promotion) on 
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the import demand for U.S. whey in Mexico (Tables 39 and 41). Import demand for whey 
in Mexico therefore seems unresponsive to the U.S. promotional efforts, probably due to 
the low levels of whey promotion expenditures. Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) reported 
that the U.S. walnut export promotion in the European Union were not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable in the Mexican whey 
import market are presented in Table 38 and 40. While seasonality significantly increases 
the demand for whey from the EU and U.S., in quarters III and IV respectively,, the 
effects are significantly negative on those from ROW in quarters III and IV, compared to 
the first quarter. Milk production in Mexico peaks between June and September (Escoto, 
Cortes, and Macias, 2001), domestic production of NFDM, cheese and whey from raw 
milk are expected to be high in the third quarter compared to quarters I, II, and IV. 
Demand for imported whey is assumed to fall in the third quarter and to increase in 
quarters I, II, and IV.  
 
South Korea 
Parameter Estimates 
 Parameter estimates of South Korea import demand for whey are presented in 
Table 36. 
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Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
All the Marshallian and Hicksian own-price elasticities in the South Korean whey 
import demand system are greater than one in absolute value, negative and significant at 
the one percent level except for U.S. Hicksian own price elasticity which is significant at 
the five percent level (Tables 42 and 43). The own-price elasticities are in agreement with 
economic theory. The Hicksian elasticities indicate that a one percent increase in own-
price would result in the South Korean whey consumers decreasing their demand for 
whey from the U.S., EU, and ROW by 1.20%, 1.08%, and 1.38% respectively (Table 43). 
Substitutability relationships exist among all the whey imported from different sources, 
but only one of the Marshallian cross price elasticity is significant (at the 10 percent 
level) while four (4) of the Hicksian cross price elasticities are significant substitutes at 
the five percent level.  
Expenditure elasticities are positive at significant at one, five and 10 percent 
levels for the U.S, EU, and ROW respectively (Tables 43). The U.S. expenditure 
elasticity is greater than one in absolute value, while those of the EU and ROW are less 
than one. An increase of one percent in the expenditures on imported whey in South 
Korea would lead to an increase of 1.37%, 0.66%, and 0.86% in the demand for whey 
from the U.S., EU, and ROW. With an anticipated growing income in South Korea, a 
greater percentage of the increase in expenditure on whey will go to the demand for U.S. 
Whey. Although there is no significant effect of U.S whey export promotion on the 
demand for whey in South Korea, effect is positive on the demand for U.S. whey, and 
negative on the sales of EU and ROW whey (Table 43). South Korea as a market for U.S. 
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whey is tends to be unresponsive to U.S. whey promotion expenditures .This may be due 
to the low level of funds devoted to whey export promotion activities in South Korea. 
 
Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of the seasonal indicator variable for the South Korean whey 
import demand system are presented in Table 42. Demand for whey from The EU are 
significantly higher in quarters II, III, and IV; and lower for those from ROW in the 
quarter III, compared to quarter I. Demand for whey imports is expected to rise in spring 
and autumn, that is, second and fourth quarters; and to decline in the first quarter since 
market demand for milk is high in spring and autumn (second and fourth quarters) with 
less milk available for processing. 
 
Thailand 
Parameter Estimates 
 Parameter estimates of the import demand for Whey in Thailand are shown in 
Table 37. 
 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities 
 Own price elasticities in Thailand for the U.S., EU and ROW whey are negative 
and significant while it is positive, and insignificant for Australian whey (Tables 44 and 
45). Marshallian own-price elasticities are significant at the 10 percent levels for US 
whey and at the one percent level for the EU and ROW whey (Table 44). However, the 
U.S. Hicksian own-price elasticity is not significant at the 10 percent level while those of 
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the EU and ROW are significant at the five and one percent respectively (Table 45). A 
one percent increase in own-price would decrease the demand for whey from the EU and 
ROW significantly by 0.525, and 0.99% respectively; and from the U.S., and Australia 
insignificantly by 0.6% and 0.76% respectively (Table 45).None of the Marshallian cross 
price elasticities is significant at the 10 percent level, although there are four (4) 
substitutability and eight (8) complementarities among whey imported from different 
sources (Table 44). Six (6) out of the 12 Hicksian cross-price elasticities are substitutes to 
each other, with the US and EU whey being significant substitutes at the five percent 
level. There are also six insignificant complementarities among the Hicksian cross-price 
elasticities (Table 45). 
All expenditure elasticities are positive; conforming to economic theory, with 
those of the U.S. and EU being significant at the one (1) percent level (Table 45) The 
U.S. expenditure shows an elastic response, an indication that the U.S. exporters of whey 
products stand to benefit most from an increase in expenditures on imported whey in 
Thailand. U.S. whey promotion effects are significantly positive on the demand for 
Australian whey, portraying a positive spillover effect of U.S. whey export promotion 
effects on the sales of Australian whey in Thailand. The demand for U.S. whey in 
Thailand shows no significant response to whey promotion efforts by the U.S. (Table 45). 
 
Effects of Seasonality 
Table 44 shows the parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable for whey 
imports in Thailand. Import demand for U.S whey is significantly lower in quarter III, but 
higher in the same quarter for whey from the EU. In Thailand, the school milk program 
of the National Milk Drinking Campaign Board accounts for over 40 percent of local 
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milk production and leads excess supply of milk during school breaks (Rabobank, 
2004).Schools in Thailand are in session from May to October, and November  to March. 
Availability of milk for purposes other than drinking is less in quarters I, III, and IV; and 
import demand for whey is assumed to increase at this time of the year, with a decline in 
the second quarter. 
 
NFDM 
Mexico 
Parameter Estimates 
 The parameter estimates of the import demand for NFDM in Mexico are 
presented in Table 46. 
 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities 
In the Mexican import demand system, all the Marshallian own-price elasticities 
are negative, but significant at the five percent level for the EU and at one percent for 
ROW (Table 49). The U.S Hicksian own-price elasticity is positive but insignificant at 
the 10 percent level, while all the other own price elasticities are negative, and significant 
for EU at five percent level and at one percent level for ROW (Table 50). The Hicksian 
price elasticities indicate that a one percent increase in own-price would result in a 
decrease of over 4% and 8% respectively in the demand for NFDM from the EU and 
ROW. There are 10 positive, and 10 negative Marshallian cross price elasticities, with 
only the New Zealand NFDM in the Canadian NFDM equation is significant at the 10 
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percent level (Table 49). Only two of the 20 Hicksian cross-price elasticities are 
significant with NFDM imported into Mexico from Canada and New Zealand being 
significant complements to each at the 10 percent level (Table 50).  
Expenditure elasticities are all positive except for New Zealand equation. Both the 
U.S. and EU expenditure elasticities are not significant at the 10 percent level, and are 
less than one in absolute value while those of Canada and ROW are greater than one in 
absolute value and significant at the five and one percent levels respectively (Table 50). 
NFDM from ROW will significantly account for a larger percentage of any increase in 
the Mexican expenditure on imported NFDM. Although the U.S. expenditure elasticity is 
not significant, NFDM imports from the U.S. into Mexico would probably continue to 
account for a larger share of the Mexican NFDM expenditure because of the NAFTA 
agreement. The U.S budget share in the Mexican NFDM import market is about 50 
percent. The U.S NFDM promotion and elasticities are small, and promotion 
expenditures have no significant effects on the demand for NFDM in Mexico (Table 50). 
Although promotion effects on the sales of U.S. NFDM are positive, these are not 
significantly different from zero. Le, Kaiser, and Tomek (1998) also reported positive, 
insignificant effects of promotion expenditures on the import demand for U.S. red meat 
in Taiwan. Halliburton and Henneberry (1995) similarly reported the ineffectiveness of 
promotion on the import demand for U.S. almonds in South Korea, and Singapore. They 
attributed promotion ineffectiveness to maturity of the markets for U.S. almonds, low 
levels of promotion expenditures, and ineffective allocation of funds to promotion 
activities. Only 2.1% of FAS promotion expenditures on dairy export market 
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development was on NFDM (Table 7), and NFDM received the least funding among the 
three dairy products from the government and the dairy industry (Tables 9-11). 
 
Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable for the Mexican NFDM import 
demand system are presented in Table 49. Demand for NFDM from the U.S. is 
significantly higher in quarters II, and III, compared to the first quarter. Demand for 
imported NFDM is assumed to fall in the third quarter and to rise in quarters I, II, and IV 
due to the fact that milk production in Mexico peaks between June and September 
(Escoto, Cortes, and Macias, 2001), and domestic production of NFDM from raw milk is 
expected to be high in the third quarter compared to quarters I, II, and IV.  
 
Japan 
Parameter Estimates 
 Parameter estimates of Japan import demand for NFDM are shown Table 47.  
 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
Tables 51 and 52 shows the elasticities for NFDM import demand in Japan. All 
the Marshallian and Hicksian own price elasticities are negative except for those of the 
U.S. which are positive but insignificant at the 10 percent level. While the Marshallian 
own-price elasticities for the EU and New Zealand are significant at the five percent 
level, they are significant at the 10 percent level for the Hicksian own-price elasticities. 
The Hicksian price elasticities indicate an increase of 1.19% and 1.22% in the demand for 
NFDM from the EU, and New Zealand respectively, with a one percent increase in own-
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price (Table 52). There are 18 positive Marshallian and 18 positive Hicksian cross price 
elasticities, suggesting substitutability relationships among NFDM from different 
sources. However, while none of the Marshallian positive cross price elasticities is 
significant at the 10 percent level, four (4) of the Hicksian substitutability relationships 
are significant (Tables 51 and 52). The EU and U.S. NFDM; and EU and Ukraine NFDM 
are significant substitutes to each other at the 10% level (Table 52). Twelve of the cross-
price elasticities have negative signs with four (4) of the Marshallian elasticities and two 
(2) of the Hicksian elasticities being significant (Tables 51 and 52). All expenditure 
elasticities are positive, significant at one percent level for the EU, Australia, and New 
Zealand, at 10 percent for Ukraine; and insignificant at 10 percent level for US and 
ROW. Australian NFDM exporters are likely to benefit most from an increase in NFDM 
import expenditures in Japan, as a one percent increase in expenditures on NFDM 
imports would result in over 3% increase in the demand for NFDM from Australia. The 
impact of U.S. NFDM promotion on import demand for NFDM in Japan is small but its 
current and total effect has negative and significant effects on the demand for the NFDM 
imported from the EU. Promotion did not have any other significant effects on the 
demand for NFDM in Japan (Table 52). Export Promotion efforts of the U.S. in the 
Japanese NFDM market is not significantly different from zero. This may be associated 
with low levels of promotion expenditures on this commodity in Japan (Table 11).  
 
Effects of Seasonality 
The parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable for the Japanese NFDM 
import demand system are presented in Table 51. Seasonality effects show a significant 
increase in the demand for NFDM from the EU in quarters II, III, and IV; in quarters II, 
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and IV for Australian NFDM; and in quarter III for NFDM from Ukraine. However, 
NFDM from ROW is significantly reduced in quarter III. Import of NFDM is assumed to 
increase in all quarters.  
 
Thailand 
Parameter Estimates 
 Parameter estimates for NFDM import demand in Thailand are presented in 
Table 48. 
 
Expenditure, Promotion and Price Elasticities  
Own-price elasticities are negative for the U.S, EU, and ROW but positive for 
Australia and New Zealand in the import demand system for NFDM in Thailand. ROW 
own-price elasticities are significant at the five percent level (Tables 53 and 54). The 
Hicksian price elasticities suggest an increase of over 7% in the demand for NFDM from 
ROW with a one percent increase in own-price. New Zealand Hicksian own-price 
elasticity is positive and significant at 10 percent level (Table 54). Nine (9) of the 20 
Marshallian cross price elasticities are positive, with the US and ROW NFDM exhibiting 
a significant substitutability relationship between each other. There are 11 negative cross 
price elasticities with two being significant at the five and 10 percent levels (Table 53). 
Ten of the Hicksian cross price elasticities are substitutes while 10 suggests 
complementarities among NFDM from different sources. The U.S. NFDM and ROW 
NFDM are significant substitutes while U.S. NFDM and New Zealand NFDM are 
significant complements at the five percent level (Table 54). All the expenditure 
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elasticities are positive, significant at the one percent level for US, EU, Australia and 
New Zealand and insignificant for ROW at 10 percent level. The U.S. NFDM exporters 
are in a position to benefit from an increase in import expenditures on NFDM, as a one 
percent increase in expenditures on NFDM would result in over 6% increase in the 
demand for U.S NFDM. While export promotion expenditures NFDM have no 
significant effect on the demand for U.S. NFDM, current promotion efforts has a 
significant and positive effect on the demand for NFDM from ROW in Thailand (Table 
54). Promotion seems to have a positive spillover effect on the demand for NFDM from 
ROW in Thailand. Similar spillover effects of U.S. apple export promotion in Singapore 
and the United Kingdom has been reported by Richards, Van Ispelen, and Kagan (1997). 
 
Effects of Seasonality 
Table 53 shows the parameter estimates of seasonal indicator variable for NFDM imports 
into Thailand. The demand for NFDM from the U.S. are significantly lower in quarters II, 
and IV; but higher in quarters II, and III, for NFDM from the EU; and in quarter IV for 
NFDM from New Zealand; compared to quarter I. Import demand for NFDM is assumed 
to be higher in quarters I, III, and IV, with a decline in the second quarter. This could be 
attributed to excess availability of milk for purposes other than drinking in the second 
quarter when school children are on break, and the school milk program is not in use. 
 
Marginal Returns to Promotion Expenditures (MRPE) 
Marginal promotion impacts on import demand is calculated by multiplying appropriate 
promotion elasticity with the ratio of mean expenditure on appropriate commodity to the 
mean promotion expenditures (Richards, Van Ispelen, and Kagan, 1997). 
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 Table 55 shows the marginal impacts of U.S. cheese promotion on import demand 
for Cheese in Mexico, South Korea and Japan. An additional dollar spent by the U.S. on 
cheese promotion in Mexico yields a return of $29.85 in the current period to U.S. dairy 
producers, while lagging promotion by one period yield negative return of $8.97. MRPE 
of total promotion expenditures is nonetheless positive for the US ($20.95). Since the 
effects of U.S. promotion expenditures on import demand are not significantly different 
from zero, and elasticities used in the calculations of the MRPE are not significant at that 
level, these returns are not significant (at 10 percent level). This may be an indication that 
cheese import demand in Mexico is not responsive to the U.S cheese promotion 
expenditures. Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) reported similarly on the U.S. walnut 
export promotion in the European Union. The MRPE on cheese promotion in the South 
Korean market shows negative returns to the U.S. in the current, lagged periods and for 
total promotion efforts (Table 55). Lagging promotion by one period result in a negative 
and significant MRPE to the U.S. dairy producers in the magnitude of $9.45 for the CBS 
and $10.63 for Rotterdam, at the one percent level. That is, using the CBS model, the 
U.S. dairy producers’ stands to lose $9.45 in the current period with an additional dollar 
spent on cheese promotion by the U.S. in South Korea. The demand for the U.S. cheese 
therefore tends to increase with a decrease in U.S cheese promotion expenditure. Total 
U.S. cheese promotion expenditures in South Korea appears to have been on the decrease 
from 1998 t0 2005 (Table 9) while cheese import demand has been on the increase 
(Table12). Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) reported similarly on the U.S. walnut export 
promotion in the Asia with walnut exports trending up while walnut promotion 
expenditures trended down; and also for Almonds in Asia (Onunkwo and Epperson, 
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2001).The decreasing marginal returns to cheese promotion expenditures in South Korea 
calls for caution in the allocation of promotion expenditures in this market. The spillover 
effect of U.S. cheese promotion in the EU is positive and significant ($6 in the lagged 
period, and $17.34 from total promotion). While export promotion efforts by the U.S. 
seem to have resulted in an increase in the demand for cheese from the EU, promotion 
efforts by the EU in South Korea could also have contributed to this positive impact of 
promotion on the demand for cheese from the EU. There is a significant marginal return 
to decreasing promotion expenditures of between $74.68 and $83.03 to ROW cheese 
(Table 55).  
 In the Japanese cheese market, although MRPE to the U.S. dairy producers in the 
current and total periods are positive ($4.77-$4.98) these are not significantly different 
from zero since the promotion elasticities associated with the MRPE are not significant. 
However lagging promotion by one period result in a MRPE of $5.12 to ROW and this is 
significant at the five percent level because of the significance of its associated elasticity 
at this level (Table 55). Ineffective allocation of funds to promotion activities by the U.S. 
in Japan may account for the .insignificant MRPE to the U.S. cheese producers. 
 The marginal returns of U.S. whey promotion expenditure in Mexico, South 
Korea, and Thailand are presented in Table 56. In all the markets the MRPE are not 
significant (except for the whey market in Thailand with a MRPE of $11.07 to Australia 
in the current period), since their associated promotion elasticities are not significant at 
the 10 percent level. Although MRPE to the U.S. dairy producers are positive, these 
markets seem to be non responsive to the U.S. whey promotional efforts. This could be 
due to to low levels of promotion expenditures devoted to whey products, compared to 
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cheese. Promotion expenditures on whey from 1998 to 2005 is low, when compared to 
cheese (Table7, 9, and 10).  
Results presented in Table 57 are the marginal returns to U.S. NFDM promotion 
expenditures in Mexico, Thailand and Japan. MRPE to producers of NFDM from ROW 
in Thailand is positive ($20.49) and significant at the 10 percent level while those 
imported from the EU into Japan are negative ($63.77 to $83.86) and significant at the 
one percent level. In all other cases, MRPE are not significantly different from zero. Non 
significant MRPE to the U.S. producers of NFDM could be due to the low levels of 
promotion expenditures devoted to NFDM, compared to cheese. High values are 
associated with the MRPE in Mexico (Table 57) and this could be associated with the 
low levels of promotion expenditures relative to the size of the market.  
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The impacts of U.S. export promotion on the import demand for cheese, whey, 
and NFDM in select countries is estimated, using the source differentiated import 
demand systems. The effects of other variables such as prices, expenditures, and 
seasonality are also investigated.  Four demand systems: Rotterdam, AIDS, CBS, and 
NBR are used in this study. A model selection test as suggested by Barten (1993) which 
nests the four demand systems into a general model are used in selecting the model which 
best explain consumer behavior. Estimations are made for each commodity for each 
country at a time in a source differentiated demand system. Based on the results of the 
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model selection test, the Rotterdam model is used to estimate the import demand for 
cheese and NFDM in Japan; whey and NFDM in Thailand; cheese in South Korea; and 
whey in Mexico. The CBS is used in estimating the import demand for cheese and whey 
in South Korea; and cheese and whey in Mexico. 
 In the Mexican cheese import market, all expenditure elasticities are significant 
and positive with the exception of New Zealand with positive but insignificant 
expenditure elasticity. While Uruguay and the EU expenditure elasticities are greater than 
one (2.807 and 1.191 respectively), their own-price elasticities are not significantly 
different from zero. The U.S. and ROW expenditure elasticities are inelastic, suggesting 
that cheese from these sources are necessities in Mexico. The impacts of U.S. cheese 
promotion expenditures on demand are not significant, although they are positive in the 
current period and in total for the U.S cheese. Cheese from Uruguay and New Zealand 
are significant substitutes to each other, as well as those of ROW and the EU. Mexico 
appears to be a mature market for U.S. cheese exports. 
 The South Korean cheese import demand using the CBS and Rotterdam models 
yield similar results. Expenditure elasticities are positive and mostly significant. With the 
exception of the U.S. cheese, all expenditure elasticities are elastic, suggesting cheese 
from these sources are luxury goods in South Korea. The EU, Australia, and New 
Zealand all have own-price elasticities greater than one in absolute value. However, for 
the U.S., own-price and expenditure elasticities are inelastic and significant. There are no 
significant Marshallian substitutes for the U.S. cheese in South Korea, and the U.S. might 
be able to use price as an advantage in competing with other suppliers of cheese in South 
Korea. U.S. cheese export promotion in the U.S. equation is negative, with its carry-over 
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effect being significant. However, total promotion elasticity is not significantly different 
from zero. Spill-over effect of the U.S. export promotion in South Korea is negative and 
significant on the demand for ROW cheese, and positively significant on the EU cheese.  
In the Japanese demand systems, all expenditure elasticities are positive, 
significant for all sources of imports with the exception of the U.S. cheese. Own-price 
elasticities are elastic and significant for cheese from the U.S, Australia, and New 
Zealand. U.S. Cheese promotion effect is only significant for ROW cheese and effect is 
positive. Although current and total promotion effects on the demand for U.S. cheese are 
not significant, these effects are positive. Australian cheese is significant substitutes to 
those of New Zealand, ROW, and U.S. 
 Expenditure and own-price elasticities for the U.S. and ROW whey in Mexico are 
significant and consistent with economic theory. Both are inelastic for the U.S. whey and 
elastic for ROW whey. Promotion effects are not significant but positive for the U.S. 
(current and total promotion effects). Positive but insignificant promotion spill-over 
effects are also noted. Although the U.S. and ROW whey are significant substitutes to 
each other, the U.S. seems to have a competitive advantage9 in the Mexican whey 
market, by using price as a weapon to increase total export revenue. 
 In the South Korean whey import market, all expenditure elasticities are 
significant although the U.S. has the most elastic expenditure elasticity, and would likely 
benefit most from an increase in expenditures on imported whey in South Korea; while 
those of the EU and ROW are inelastic. All own-price elasticities are significant and 
                                                 
9 Competitive advantage is defined, based on five fundamental competitive forces which are: entry of 
competitors, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry 
among existing players in terms of dominance (Porter, 1985). Inelastic own-price elasticity can be used by 
exporters to increase total revenue through price increase. 
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elastic. Promotion effects of the U.S. are insignificant but positive only for the U.S. 
whey, while the spill-over effects are insignificant and negative on the EU and ROW 
whey. Significant substitutability relationships exist between whey from the U.S. and 
those of the EU and ROW. 
 Marshallian own-price and expenditure elasticities of whey imported from the 
U.S. and EU into Thailand are significant and conform to economic theories, with the EU 
own-price elasticity having a significantly inelastic response, and the U.S. expenditure 
showing a significantly elastic response. U.S. has the most elastic expenditure elasticity, 
and stands to benefit most from an increase in expenditures on imported whey in 
Thailand.  ROW own-price elasticity is also negative and significant. U.S. whey 
promotion effects are significantly positive on the demand for Australian whey, and 
insignificant for whey demand from other sources. 
 In the Mexican NFDM import demand market, own-price elasticities are only 
significant for the EU and ROW while expenditure elasticities are significant for NFDM 
from Canada and ROW. None of these elasticities are significant for NFDM from the 
U.S., although the U.S. budget share in Mexico is about 50 percent. Effects of U.S. 
promotion expenditures are small and insignificant. Many studies have reported that 
promotion effects on demand is small and statistically insignificant in most cases (Brester 
and Schroder (1995); Piggot et al. (1996); Kinnucan et al. (1997); Coulibaly and Brorsen 
(1999), thereby concluding that promotion is ineffective. Brester and Schroeder (1995) 
noted quick dissipitation effects of advertising on quarterly consumption of meat and 
suggests a continual (quarterly) expenditures for an effective meat advertisement. They 
reported own-price advertising elasticities of between 7 and 90 times smaller than own-
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price elasticities. Kinnucan et al. (1997) also reported the tendency of meat advertising 
elasticities to be small compared to price and expenditure elasticities. 
 All the Marshallian and Hicksian own price elasticities in the Japanese NFDM 
import demand system are negative except for those of the U.S. which are positive but 
insignificant at the 10 percent level. All expenditure elasticities are positive, significant at 
one percent level for the EU, Australia, and New Zealand, at 10 percent for Ukraine; and 
insignificant at 10 percent level for US and ROW. The effects of U.S. NFDM promotion 
in Japan are significantly negative on NFDM from the EU, and significantly positive on 
ROW NFDM in Thailand. There are no other significant effects promotions on NFDM 
from other sources in the countries. Expenditure elasticities in both countries are positive, 
but significant for NFDM from the EU, Australia, New Zealand, and Ukraine in the 
Japanese market; and for all sources but ROW in Thailand. In Thailand, U.S. NFDM 
exporters would benefit most from a rise in expenditures on NFDM imports. Own-price 
elasticities are only significant for ROW NFDM in Thailand and for the EU and New 
Zealand in Japan. 
 Seasonality tends to play a role in the demand for cheese in Japan for cheese 
imported from Australia and the EU; and in South Korea for cheese imported from 
Australia and New Zealand. For whey, seasonality seems to play an important role in the 
demand for U.S. whey in Mexico and Thailand; whey from the EU in Mexico, South 
Korea, and Thailand; and for ROW whey in Mexico and South Korea. In the case of 
NFDM, seasonality appears to affect demand in Japan for NFDM from the EU, Australia, 
Ukraine, and ROW; while it only affects demand for U.S. NFDM in Mexico. In Thailand 
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demand for NFDM from the U.S., EU, and New Zealand is significantly influenced by 
seasonality. 
 Marginal returns to promotion expenditures (MRPE) is negative for the U.S. 
cheese in South Korea. This marginal returns to decreasing promotion expenditures 
ranges between $1 and $11.53. The EU has a positive MRPE of about $17 in the South 
Korean cheese market while returns to ROW cheese are negative ($75 – $83). It appears 
that the demand for the U.S. cheese in South Korea tends to increase with a decrease in 
U.S cheese promotion expenditure. Total U.S. cheese promotion expenditures in South 
Korea appear to have been on the decrease from 1998 to 2005 (Table 9) while cheese 
import demand has been on the increase (Table12). Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) 
reported similarly on the U.S. walnut export promotion in the Asia with walnut exports 
trending up while walnut promotion expenditures trended down; and also for Almonds in 
Asia (Onunkwo and Epperson, 2001).The decreasing marginal returns to cheese 
promotion expenditures in South Korea calls for caution in the allocation of promotion 
expenditures in this market as it tends toward maturity. Returns to ROW cheese in the 
Japanese market are significantly positive ($5.12), while MRPE for the U.S. cheese 
producers in Japan, and Mexico are not significantly different from zero.. In Thailand, 
MRPE for whey is positive for Australia ($11.07) and for ROW NFDM ($20.49) in the 
current period. However, in Japan MRPE on NFDM is negative for the EU ($63.77 - 
$83.86). MRPE for the U.S. whey producers in South Korea, and Mexico, and Thailand; 
and also for the U.S. NFDM producers in Japan, Mexico, and Thailand are not 
significantly different from zero. This may be associated with low levels of whey 
promotion expenditures, or focus of promotion activities.  
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The U.S. promotion activities in regard to these commodities seem not to be 
effective. It appears all the markets studied with the exception of the South Korean 
cheese market are non responsive to the U.S dairy export promotion efforts. Low levels 
of promotion expenditures on whey and NFDM market developments, or ineffective 
allocation of funds to promotion activities could have accounted for non responsiveness 
of these markets to promotion efforts. Promotion efforts could be geared towards 
reminding customers more about the unique features of U.S. dairy products, bearing in 
mind that other competitors with the U.S. are also involved in export promotion. 
Although promotion expenditures of competing countries are not included in this study, 
competitors’ promotion efforts could have partly accounted for the significant positive 
spillover effects of promotion in some of the selected markets. 
This study has been able to make an empirical contribution to literature as it 
represents the first empirical study known to have been conducted on the effectiveness of 
the U.S. dairy export promotion expenditure, by selected dairy products and countries. 
Promotion expenditures by product and countries are only available for few years, and 
these results in few observations for export promotion expenditures. The promotion 
expenditures used in this study are not the actual promotion expenditures, as the annual 
promotion expenditures were expanded into a quarterly basis using the “EXPAND” 
procedure in SAS, and this may have bearing on the impact of promotion expenditures as 
reported in this study. This represents a major limitation of this research. Another 
limitation of this study is the non-inclusion of U.S. competitors’ promotion expenditure. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: MAP AND FMDP Export Promotion Expenditures ($), FY 1998-2005 
 
Year USDEC-FMD Total FMD USDEC-MAP Total MAP 
1998 384786 (1.40%)a 27527813 2687338 (2.20%)a 121945816 
1999 529175 (1.71%) 30910387 1591048 (1.73%) 91818722 
2000 629545 (2.05%) 30731138 1555931 (1.64%) 94660926 
2001 622946 (2.03%) 30750004 1540887 (1.65%) 93421899 
2002 691618 (2.25%) 30773582 1712362 (1.70%) 100533928 
2003 966518 (2.92%) 33122041 2703591 (2.10%) 128944671 
2004 962091 (2.68%) 35957730 3426212 (2.51%) 136503953 
2005 1038721 (2.89%) 35897064 Open Yearb Open Yearb 
Total 5825400 (2.28%) 255669759 15217369 (1.98%) 767829915 
Source: Based on data provided by FAS, USDA (September 20, 2006) 
a Figures in parentheses represent the percentage of total FMD and MAP expenditure received by USDEC and devoted to dairy export 
market development. 
b FY 2005 was still an open year under MAP as at the time the data were provided, hence promotion expenditures was inconclusive. 
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Table 2: MAP AND FMDP Export Promotion Expenditures: Cheese (1998-2005) 
 
Country MAP Expenditure ($) Country FMDP Expenditure ($) Country FAS Expenditure ($) 
Japan 3382792 (38.7%)a Japan 233023 (30.0%)a Japan 3615814 (38.0%)a 
Mexico 3067913 (35.1%) Mexico 193678 (24.9%) Mexico 3261591 (34.3%) 
S/Korea 977478 (11.2%) China  142725 (18.4%) S/Korea 1057042 (11.1%) 
Brazil 348219 (4.0%) Brazil 79885 (10.3%) Brazil 428104 (4.5%) 
Thailand 185744 (2.1%) S/Korea 79565 (10.2%) China  285286 (3.0%) 
Taiwan 159887 (1.8%) Germany 39600 (5.1%) Thailand 185744 (2.0%) 
China  142561 (1.6%) ROW 9250 (1.2%) Taiwan 159887 (1.7%) 
ROW 473867 (5.4%) Total 777725 (100%) Germany 39600 (0.4%) 
Total 8738462 (100%)   ROW 483117 (5.1%) 
        TOTAL 9516186 (100%) 
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion Expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006) 
aFigures in parentheses represent the percentage of MAP, FMDP, and FAS total promotion expenditures devoted to market 
development activities in each country by USDEC.  
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Table 3: MAP AND FMDP Export Promotion Expenditures: Whey (1998-2005) 
 
Country MAP Expenditure ($) Country FMDP Expenditure ($) Country Total FAS Expenditure ($) 
Japan 174799 (17.0%)a S/Korea 353703 (27.2%)a Thailand 463986 (19.9%)a
Thailand 153217 (14.9%) Thailand 310769 (23.9%) S/Korea 458041 (19.6%)
S/Korea 104338 (10.1%) Mexico 214244 (16.5%) Mexico 310635 (13.3%)
Mexico 96391 (9.3%) Indonesia 91031 (7.0%) Japan 235119 (10.1%)
Brazil 51377 (5.0%) China 90980 (7.0%) China  124406 (5.3%)
China  33426 (3.2%) Japan 60320 (4.6%) Indonesia 91031 (3.9%)
Egypt 25000 (2.4%) Philippines 47290 (3.6%) Brazil 51377 (2.2%)
ROW 392529 (38.1%) ROW 133924 (10.3%) Philippines 47290 (2.0%)
Total 1031078 (100%) Total 1302261 (100%) Egypt 25000 (1.1%)
     ROW 526454 (22.6%)
        Total 2333339 (100%)
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion Expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006) 
aFigures in parentheses represent the percentage of MAP, FMDP, and FAS total promotion expenditures devoted to market 
development activities in each country by USDEC.  
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Table 4: MAP AND FMDP Export Promotion Expenditures: NFDM (1998-2005) 
 
Country MAP Expenditure ($) Country FMDP Expenditure ($) Country  Total FAS Expenditure ($) 
Thailand 64229 (32.8%)a Thailand 75631 (33.5%)a Thailand 139861 (33.2%)a
Japan 50000 (25.5%) China  57592 (25.5%) China  72592 (17.2%)
Mexico 29764 (15.2%) Philippines 19933 (8.8%) Japan 60826 (14.4%)
China  15000 (7.7%) Indonesia 19933 (8.8%) Mexico 48341 (11.5%)
Argentina 5000 (2.6%) Mexico 18576 (8.2%) Philippines 19933 (4.7%)
ROW 31734 (16.2%) Japan 10826 (4.8%) Indonesia 19933 (4.7%)
Total 195728 (100%) Malaysia 10600 (4.7%) Malaysia 10600 (2.5%)
  ROW 12575 (5.6%) Argentina 5000 (1.2%)
  Total 225669 (100%) ROW 44310 (10.5%)
       Total 421396 (100%)
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion Expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006) 
aFigures in parentheses represent the percentage of MAP, FMDP, and FAS total promotion expenditures devoted to market 
development activities in each country by USDEC.  
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Table 5: MAP Dairy Market Development Expenditures By Dairy Products 
 
 Year Cheese Whey NFDM Other Dairy Total 
1998 1341656 (49.9%)a 396892 (14.8%)a 101499 (3.8%)a 847291 (31.5%)a 2687338 (100%)
1999 852970 (53.6%) 209120 (13.1%) 36575 (2.3%) 492383 (30.9%) 1591049 (100%)
2000 984553 (63.3%) 243301 (15.6%) 57654 (3.7%) 270424 (17.4%) 1555931 (100%)
2001 1149079 (74.6%) 42686 (2.8%) -      - 349122 (22.7%) 1540887 (100%)
2002 1188788 (69.4%) 67046 (3.9%) -      - 456528 (26.7%) 1712362 (100%)
2003 1588806 (58.8%) 53449 (2.0%) -      - 1061336 (39.3%) 2703591 (100%)
2004 1632610 (47.7%) 18584 (0.5%) -      - 1775018 (51.8%) 3426212 (100%)
Year Total 8738462 (57.4%) b 1031078 (6.8%) b 195728 (1.3%) b 5252102b (34.5%) 15217369 (100%)
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion Expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006). 
a Figures in parentheses represent the product's promotion expenditures  as percentage of  total dairy   promotion expenditures devoted 
to market development activities each year by USDEC. 
b Figures in parentheses represent product's year totals as percentage of  dairy year totals promotion  expenditures devoted to market 
development activities worldwide by USDEC. 
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Table 6: FMDP Dairy Market Development Expenditures By Dairy Products 
 
 Year Cheese Whey NFDM Other Dairy Total 
2000 140036 (22.2%)a - - 28550 (4.5%)a 460959 (73.2%)a 629545 (100.0%)
2001 115993 (18.6%) 327684 (52.6%)a 8373 (1.3%) 170897 (27.4%) 622946 (100.0%)
2002 106587 (15.4%) 250771 (36.3%) 71547 (10.3%) 262714 (38.0%) 691618 (100.0%)
2003 247166 (25.6%) 240742 (24.9%) 66717 (6.9%) 411893 (42.6%) 966518 (100.0%)
2004 103496 (10.8%) 201047 (20.9%) - - 657548 (68.3%) 962091 (100.0%)
2005 64447 (6.2%) 282018 (27.2%) 50482 (4.9%) 641775 (61.8%) 1038721 (100.0%)
2000-2005 Total 777725 (15.8%)b 1302261 (26.5%)b 225669 (4.6)%b 2605786 (53.1%)b 4911440 (100.0%)
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion Expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006). 
a Figures in parentheses represent the product's promotion expenditures  as percentage of  total dairy   promotion expenditures devoted 
to market development activities each year by USDEC. 
b Figures in parentheses represent product's year totals as percentage of  dairy year totals promotion  expenditures devoted to market 
development activities worldwide by USDEC. 
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Table 7: FAS Dairy Market Development Expenditures By Dairy Products 
 
Year Cheese Whey NFDM Other Dairy Totalc 
1998 1341656 (49.9%)a 396892 (14.8%)a 101499 (3.8%)a 847291 (31.5%)a 2687338 (100.0%)
1999 852970 (53.6%) 209120 (13.1%) 36575 (2.3%) 492383 (30.9%) 1591049 (100.0%)
2000 1124589 (51.5%) 243301 (11.1%) 86204 (3.9%) 731383 (33.5%) 2185476 (100.0%)
2001 1265071 (58.5%) 370370 (17.1%) 8373 (0.4%) 520019 (24.0%) 2163833 (100.0%)
2002 1295375 (53.9%) 317816 (13.2%) 71547 (3.0%) 719242 (29.9%) 2403980 (100.0%)
2003 1835972 (50.0%) 294191 (8.0%) 66717 (1.8%) 1473229 (40.1%) 3670109 (100.0%)
2004 1736106 (39.6%) 219631 (5.0%) - - 2432566 (55.4%) 4388303 (100.0%)
2005 64447 (6.2%) 282018 (27.2%) 50482 (4.9%) 641775 (61.8%) 1038721 (100.0%)
1998-2005Total 9516186 (47.3%)b 2333339 (11.6%)b 421396 (2.1%)b 7857888 (39.0%)b 20128809 (100.0%)
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion Expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006). 
a Figures in parentheses represent the product's promotion expenditures  as percentage of  total dairy   promotion expenditures devoted 
to market development activities each year by USDEC. 
b Figures in parentheses represent product's year totals as percentage of  dairy year totals promotion  expenditures devoted to market 
development activities worldwide by USDEC. 
c Total FAS promotion expenditures on all dairy products excludes FMDP expenditures for 1998 and 1999, since expenditures by 
dairy products under FMDP started in FY 2000 Also MAP expenditures for FY 2005 are excluded. 
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Table 8: USDEC Export Promotion Expenditures on Cheese, Whey, and NFDM (1998-2005) 
  
    Cheese   Whey  NFDM 
Year Mexico Japan S/Korea Mexico SE Asia S/Korea Mexico Japan SE Asia 
1998 54000 125000 24000 41000 25000 66000 12000 0 17000
1999 230000 156000 110000 36000 56000 39000 0 0 20000
2000 316000 434000 131000 134000 52000 32000 2000 0 29000
2001 184000 187000 102000 66000 92000 63000 0 0 0
2002 244000 167000 83000 102000 111000 39000 0 0 14000
2003 72000 67000 81000 52000 88000 49000 0 0 25000
2004 99000 89000 73000 78000 81000 41000 17000 0 35000
2005 98000 91000 78000 69000 325000 91000 10000 0 37000
Total 1297000 1316000   682000   578000 830000 420000 41000 0 177000
Source: Compiled from data provided by USDEC (September 13, 2007). 
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Table 9: Total Cheese Promotion Expenditures in Japan, Mexico, and South Korea (1998-2005) 
   
    Japan     Mexico     South Korea   
Year FAS USDEC Total FAS USDEC Total FAS USDEC Total 
1998 575314 125000 700314 436848 54000 490848 174699 24000 198699
1999 363687 156000 519687 329256 230000 559256 119272 110000 229272
2000 591191 434000 1025191 348740 316000 664740 68335 131000 199335
2001 451361 187000 638361 599842 184000 783842 80329 102000 182329
2002 552031 167000 719031 506699 244000 750699 94713 83000 177713
2003 570175 67000 637175 552731 72000 624731 295912 81000 376912
2004 512055 89000 601055 467475 99000 566475 223781 73000 296781
2005 0 91000 91000 20000 98000 118000 0 78000 78000
Total 3615814 1316000 4931814 3261591 1297000 4558591 1057043 682000 1739043
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006) and from 
data provided by USDEC (September 13, 2007).      
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Table 10: Total Whey Promotion Expenditures in Thailand, Mexico, and South Korea (1998-2005) 
   
   Thailand*   Mexico     South Korea   
Year FAS USDEC Total FAS USDEC Total FAS USDEC Total 
1998 0 25000 25000 48234 41000 89234 0 66000 66000
1999 62504 56000 118504 30583 36000 66583 36314 39000 75314
2000 40000 52000 92000 17573 134000 151573 26161 32000 58161
2001 10000 92000 102000 65180 66000 131180 102250 63000 165250
2002 77034 111000 188034 49514 102000 151514 90368 39000 129368
2003 11036 88000 99036 47187 52000 99187 82109 49000 131109
2004 128412 81000 209412 0 78000 78000 72907 41000 113907
2005 135000 325000 460000 52362 69000 121362 47932 91000 138932
Total 463986 830000 1293986 310635 578000 888635 458041 420000 878041
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006) and from 
data provided by USDEC (September 13, 2007).      
* USDEC promotion expenditure in Thailand represents the industry's expenditure in South East Asia.  
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Table 11: Total NFDM Promotion Expenditures in Japan, Mexico, and Thailand (1998-2005) 
   
    Japan     Mexico     Thailand* 
Year FAS USDEC Total FAS USDEC Total FAS USDEC Total 
1998 50000 0 50000 19764 12000 31764 0 17000 17000
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 36575 20000 56575
2000 8733 0 8733 26483 2000 28483 27654 29000 56654
2001 2093 0 2093 2093 0 2093 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 25032 14000 39032
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 10600 25000 35600
2004 0 0 0 0 17000 17000 0 35000 35000
2005 0 0 0 0 10000 10000 40000 37000 77000
Total 60826 0 60826 48341 41000 89341 139861 177000 316861
Source: Compiled from FAS promotion expenditures provided by USDA-FAS (September 20, 2006) and from 
data provided by USDEC (September 13, 2007).      
* USDEC promotion expenditure in Thailand represents the industry’s expenditure in South East Asia.  
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Table 12: Total U.S. Cheese Exports to South Korea, Mexico, and Japan (1998-2005 
Values) 
    
Year South Korea Mexico Japan
1998 6881985 24371094 25149374
1999 7952719 25102395 24201748
2000 11792637 45608857 27981283
2001 14371828 65449528 28380522
2002 14531247 66704454 28712407
2003 17083464 75713993 26294500
2004 20609677 94847335 30211668
2005 25491499 92869795 29667573
Source: Compiled from Trade data provided by USDA-FAS (April 26, 2007) 
 
 
Table 13: Total U.S. Whey Exports to South Korea, Mexico, and Thailand (1998-
2005 Values) 
 
    
Year South Korea Mexico Thailand
1998 8199929 33986664 3586178
1999 8038076 28399752 6862762
2000 12363973 30042049 7755657
2001 11790187 38137606 7347039
2002 9060200 31701948 6899295
2003 10740746 29276546 7234425
2004 11328905 38115638 6570579
2005 19904892 43017245 11668942
Source: Compiled from Trade data provided by USDA-FAS (April 26, 2007) 
 
 
Table 14: Total U.S. NFDM Exports to Japan, Mexico, and Thailand (1998-2005 
Values) 
 
Year Japan Mexico Thailand 
1998 58569 70450279 9236050
1999 183234 79849631 4859549
2000 160678 57673955 2100229
2001 791584 136362693 6065397
2002 8656 73775406 6039283
2003 4947661 115400032 6141860
2004 26646999 196574098 10519612
2005 25192675 292422965 15682577
Source: Compiled from Trade data provided by USDA-FAS (April 26, 2007) 
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Table 15: Promotion Studies: Returns to Promotion Expenditures (RPE) 
 
Products Authors RPE ($) 
Vidalia onions Costa, Epperson, Huang, and McKissick (2002)  $52.68  
Grapefruits Exports Fuller and Bello (1992) $4.13 - 6.65 
Apple exports Richard, Van Ispelen, and Kagan (1997) $24.72 - 27.84 
Tobacco Rosson, Hamming, and Jones (1986) $31  
Apples Rosson, Hamming, and Jones (1986) $60  
Almond Halliburton and Henneberry (1995) $4.95 - 8.59 
Almond Onunkwo and Epperson (2001) -$47.74 
Walnuts Onunkwo and Epperson (2000b) -$6.14 
Frozen Potatoes Lanclos, Devados, and Guenthner (1997) $1.13 - 16.36 
Frozen concentrated orange juice Armah and Epperson (1997) $5.61 - 51.92 
Rice Wang (2005) $10 - 40 
Source: Various Journal Publications 
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Table 16: Model Selection Test for non-Separable Commodities (p-values) 
 
 Model Thailand  South Korea  Japan  
  Whey and NFDM Cheese and Whey Cheese and NFDM 
Rotterdam 0.019 0.000 0.000 
AIDS 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CBS 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NBR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test was not conducted for Mexico because there was the problem of insufficient degrees 
of freedom. 
 
 
 
Table 17: Results of Weak Separability Tests 
  
Country Products p-value Conclusion 
Japan Cheese and NFDM 0.108 Reject not separability 
Thailand Whey and NFDM 0.935 Reject not separability 
SouthKorea Cheese and Whey 0.120 Reject not separability 
Mexico Cheese, Whey, NFDM *  
* There was the problem of insufficient degrees of freedom; assumed separability not  
rejected. 
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Table 18: Results of the Model Selection Tests (p-values) 
 
 
Model Thailand South Korea Japan Mexico 
 Whey NFDM Cheese Whey Cheese NFDM Cheese Whey NFDM 
Rotterdam 0.145 0.975 0.405 0.003 0.017 0.023 0.016 0.443 0.208 
AIDS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
CBS 0.013 0.000 0.866 0.065 0.008 0.000 0.492 0.093 0.058 
NBR 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Selection Rotterdam Rotterdam CBS, Rotterdam CBS Rotterdam Rotterdam CBS CBS, Rotterdam Rotterdam
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Table 19: Misspecification Test Results for Whey Import Demand in Mexico, Thailand, and South Korea 
         
Normality     Joint Conditional Mean   Joint Conditional Variance   
Mexico Rotterdam CBS Mexico Rotterdam CBS Mexico Rotterdam CBS 
Whey from U.S. 0.506a 0.502 Parameter Stability 0.224 0.402 Variance Stability 0.480 0.290 
Whey from EU 0.116 0.113 Linear Functional Form 0.045 0.432 Static Homoskedasticity 0.807 0.376 
Whey from ROW 0.786 0.445 No Autocorrelation 0.494 0.500 Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.482 0.808 
   Joint Test 0.135 0.600 Joint 0.822 0.635 
         
Thailand Rotterdam  Thailand Rotterdam  Thailand Rotterdam  
Whey from U.S. 0.409  Parameter Stability 0.071  Variance Stability 0.397  
Whey from EU 0.609  Linear Functional Form 0.886  Static Homoskedasticity 0.565  
Whey from Australia 0.163  No Autocorrelation 0.158  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.219  
Whey from ROW <0.000  Joint Test 0.356  Joint 0.460  
         
South Korea CBS  South Korea CBS  South Korea CBS  
Whey from U.S. 0.840  Parameter Stability 0.437  Variance Stability 0.063  
Whey from EU 0.691  Linear Functional Form 0.652  Static Homoskedasticity 0.327  
Whey from ROW 0.539  No Autocorrelation 0.000  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.308  
      Joint Test 0.007   Joint 0.224   
a p-values 
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Table 20: Misspecification Test Results for Cheese Import Demand in Mexico, South Korea, and Japan 
         
Normality     Joint Conditional Mean   Joint Conditional Variance   
Mexico CBS  Mexico CBS  Mexico CBS  
Cheese from U.S. 0.844a  Parameter Stability 0.032  Variance Stability 0.685  
Cheese from EU 0.691  Linear Functional Form 0.007  Static Homoskedasticity 0.040  
Cheese from Uruguay 0.280  No Autocorrelation 0.030  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.670  
Cheese from N/Zealand 0.013  Joint Test 0.001  Joint 0.142  
Cheese from ROW 0.045        
         
South Korea Rotterdam CBS South Korea Rotterdam CBS South Korea Rotterdam CBS
Cheese from U.S. 0.294 0.164 Parameter Stability 0.252 0.168 Variance Stability 0.116 0.161
Cheese from EU 0.078 0.173 Linear Functional Form 0.038 0.368 Static Homoskedasticity 0.284 0.888
Cheese from Australia 0.244 0.648 No Autocorrelation 0.324 0.600 Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.392 0.156
Cheese from N/Zealand 0.156 0.176 Joint Test 0.101 0.264 Joint 0.135 0.323
Cheese from ROW 0.424 0.179       
         
Japan Rotterdam  Japan Rotterdam  Japan Rotterdam  
Cheese from U.S. 0.093  Parameter Stability 0.972  Variance Stability 0.827  
Cheese from EU 0.490  Linear Functional Form 0.227  Static Homoskedasticity 0.741  
Cheese from Australia 0.671  No Autocorrelation 0.429  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.138  
Cheese from N/Zealand 0.919  Joint Test 0.493  Joint 0.574  
Cheese from ROW 0.113               
a p-value 
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Table 21: Misspecification Test Results for NFDM Import Demand in Mexico, Thailand, and Japan 
        
Normality     Joint Conditional Mean   Joint Conditional Variance 
Mexico Rotterdam  Mexico Rotterdam  Mexico Rotterdam 
NFDM from U.S. 0.840a  Parameter Stability 0.957  Variance Stability 0.103 
NFDM from EU 0.200  Linear Functional Form 0.001  Static Homoskedasticity 0.000 
NFDM from Canada 0.428  No Autocorrelation 0.729  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.519 
NFDM from N/Zealand 0.068  Joint Test 0.041  Joint 0.000 
NFDM from ROW 0.999       
        
Thailand Rotterdam  Thailand Rotterdam  Thailand Rotterdam 
NFDM from U.S. 0.673  Parameter Stability 0.829  Variance Stability 0.390 
NFDM from EU 0.438  Linear Functional Form 0.000  Static Homoskedasticity 0.000 
NFDM from Australia 0.438  No Autocorrelation 0.037  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.953 
NFDM from N/Zealand 0.438  Joint Test 0.002  Joint 0.000 
NFDM from ROW 0.409       
        
Japan Rotterdam  Japan Rotterdam  Japan Rotterdam 
NFDM from U.S. 0.160  Parameter Stability 0.659  Variance Stability 0.419 
NFDM from EU 0.155  Linear Functional Form 0.326  Static Homoskedasticity 0.004 
NFDM from Australia 0.633  No Autocorrelation 0.002  Dynamic Homoskedasticity 0.443 
NFDM from N/Zealand 0.766  Joint Test 0.023  Joint 0.012 
NFDM from Ukraine 0.158       
NFDM from ROW 0.252             
a p-value        
 
 122
Table 22: Parameter Estimates of Mexico Import Demand for Cheese using  
CBS Model 
      
Independent variable U.S. EU Uruguay New Zealand ROW 
Intercept 0.059 0.010 0.011 -0.066 -0.013 
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.029) (0.041) (0.038) 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.304 0.070 0.021 0.124 0.088 
 (0.115)** (0.071) (0.069) (0.097) (0.087) 
Price of cheese from EU   -0.111 -0.014 -0.134 0.188 
  (0.100) (0.078) (0.107) (0.081)** 
Price of cheese from Uruguay    -0.132 0.207 -0.082 
   (0.113) (0.099)** (0.090) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand     -0.335 0.137 
    (0.179)* (0.113) 
Price of cheese from ROW      -0.331 
     (0.128)** 
Expenditure -0.075 0.035 0.159 -0.079 -0.040 
 (0.124) (0.086) (0.079)* (0.114) (0.103) 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion 0.095 0.022 -0.027 -0.054 -0.035 
 (0.063) (0.049) (0.042) (0.064) (0.055) 
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.029 -0.024 0.021 0.003 0.027 
 0.053  (0.039) (0.035) (0.054) (0.044) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level 
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Table 23: Parameter Estimates of South Korea Import Demand for Cheese using CBS 
Model 
      
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia 
New 
Zealand ROW 
Intercept 0.009 -0.011 -0.017 0.022 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013) 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.154 -0.049 0.109 0.069 0.026 
 (0.055)** (0.033) (0.068) (0.086) (0.018) 
Price of cheese from EU   -0.174 0.151 0.047 0.024 
  (0.039)*** (0.058)** (0.067) (0.016) 
Price of cheese from Australia    -0.455 0.203 -0.008 
   (0.171)** (0.168) (0.029) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand     -0.298 -0.021 
    (0.220) (0.041) 
Price of cheese from ROW      -0.021 
     (0.024) 
Expenditure -0.087 0.037 0.017 0.014 0.018 
 (0.043)* (0.036) (0.066) (0.093) (0.052) 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion -0.003 0.027 0.045 -0.018 -0.051 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.031) (0.042) (0.025)**
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.024 0.014 -0.002 0.008 0.004 
 (0.008)*** (0.007)* (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 24: Parameter Estimates of South Korea Import Demand for Cheese using 
Rotterdam Model 
      
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia 
New 
Zealand ROW 
Intercept 0.009 -0.011 -0.013 0.020 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013) 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.148 -0.053 0.116 0.061 0.024 
 (0.053)** (0.033) (0.067)* (0.086) (0.018) 
Price of cheese from EU   -0.184 0.165 0.057 0.014 
  (0.042)*** (0.060)** (0.070) (0.017) 
Price of cheese from Australia    -0.478 0.193 0.004 
   (0.171)** (0.171) (0.029) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand    -0.288 -0.023 
    (0.227) (0.041) 
Price of cheese from ROW      -0.019 
     (0.024) 
Expenditure 0.081 0.120 0.403 0.311 0.084 
 (0.042)* (0.039)*** (0.066)*** (0.093)*** (0.052) 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion -0.002 0.028 0.049 -0.019 -0.055 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.031) (0.042) (0.025)**
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.027 0.012 -0.005 0.015 0.005 
 (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 25: Parameter Estimates of Japanese Import Demand for Cheese using 
Rotterdam Model 
      
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Intercept -0.001 -0.036 0.042 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.011)*** (0.020)** (0.010) (0.004) 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.078 0.009 0.105 -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.015)*** (0.028) (0.054)* (0.032) (0.012) 
Price of cheese from EU   -0.068 0.111 -0.023 -0.029 
  (0.108) (0.172) (0.082) (0.030) 
Price of cheese from Australia    -0.835 0.506 0.112 
   (0.365)** (0.196)** (0.065)* 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand     -0.422 -0.042 
    (0.138)*** (0.041) 
Price of cheese from ROW      -0.023 
     (0.023) 
Expenditure 0.018 0.223 0.530 0.173 0.056 
 (0.019) (0.051)*** (0.092)*** (0.051)*** (0.018)***
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion 0.005 -0.003 0.008 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.005) 
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.0002 0.012 -0.023 0.006 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003)**
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 26: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
Mexican Cheese Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Uruguay New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -1.134 -0.040 -0.759 0.722 0.085 
 (0.346)*** (0.396) (0.785) (0.694) (0.388) 
Price of cheese from EU  0.053 -0.822 -0.670 -1.030 0.661 
 (0.234) (0.561) (0.889) (0.767) (0.364)* 
Price of cheese from Uruguay  -0.010 -0.181 -1.747 1.465 0.521 
 (0.229) (0.435) (1.284) (0.673)** (0.403) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand 0.237 -0.904 1.957 -2.436 -0.472 
 (0.298) (0.594) (1.124)* (0.706)* (0.497) 
Price of cheese from ROW  0.063 0.754 -1.586 0.870 -1.620 
 (0.273) (0.452) (1.541)* (0.806) (0.562)***
Quarter II -0.089 0.013 -0.029 0.057 0.047 
 (0.068) (0.049) (0.046) (0.065) (0.061) 
Quarter III -0.026 -0.026 -0.013 0.070 -0.006 
 (0.044) (0.032) (0.029) (0.042) (0.038) 
Quarter IV -0.094 -0.043 -0.015 0.139 0.012 
  (0.087) (0.066) (0.059) (0.082) (0.075) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 27: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities of Mexican 
Cheese Import Demand using the CBS model  
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Uruguay New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.852 0.385 0.241 0.880 0.379 
 (0.323)*** (0.387) (0.781) (0.684) (0.374) 
Price of cheese from EU  0.197 -0.606 -0.158 -0.949 0.811 
 (0.198) (0.554) (0.886) (0.758) (0.349)***
Price of cheese from Uruguay  0.059 -0.076 -1.489 1.464 -0.355 
 (0.193) (0.427) (1.281) (0.697)*** (0.389) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand  0.349 -0.735 2.353 -2.373 0.593 
 (0.271) (0.588) (1.121)*** (1.266)** (0.486) 
Price of cheese from ROW  0.247 1.031 -0.936 0.973 -1.429 
  (0.243) (0.443)*** (1.026) (0.797) (0.552)***
 Expenditure 0.791 1.191 2.807 0.445 0.826 
 (0.348)*** (0.471)*** (0.897)*** (0.803) (0.445)**
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion 0.267 0.121 -0.310 -0.384 -0.151 
 (0.177) (0.271) (0.469) (0.449) (0.233) 
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.080 -0.131 0.241 0.024 0.118 
 (0.149) (0.214) (0.385) (0.380) (0.191) 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona 0.187 -0.010 -0.070 -0.360 -0.033 
  (0.149) (0.210) (0.379) (0.347) (0.193) 
** Significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 28: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
South Korean Cheese Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.988 -0.703 0.120 0.058 0.140 
 (0.327)*** (0.323)** (0.190) (0.304) (0.273) 
Price of cheese from EU  -0.338 -1.823 0.307 0.055 0.209 
 (0.194)* (0.379)** (0.163)* (0.235) (0.229) 
Price of cheese from Australia  0.460 0.965 -1.630 0.319 -0.748 
 (0.409) (0.581) (0.477)*** (0.596) (0.461) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand 0.261 0.064 0.254 -1.333 -0.475 
 (0.507) (0.651) (0.465) (0.773) (0.591) 
Price of cheese from ROW  0.115 0.138 -0.097 -0.148 -0.383 
 (0.109) (0.159) (0.080) (0.146) (0.328) 
Quarter II -0.022 0.011 0.040 -0.037 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.022)* (0.031) (0.018) 
Quarter III -0.005 0.015 -0.037 0.016 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.030) (0.017) 
Quarter IV -0.001 0.014 0.047 -0.068 0.008 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.021)** (0.029)** (0.017) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 29: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for South 
Korean Cheese Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable   U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.904 -0.472 0.298 0.237 0.354 
 (0.326)** (0.318) (0.187) (0.296) (0.255) 
Price of cheese from EU  -0.288 -1.682 0.415 0.164 0.339 
 (0.194) (0.378)*** (0.161)** (0.231) (0.255) 
Price of cheese from Australia  0.403 1.460 -1.248 0.701 -0.111 
 (0.505) (0.567)** (0.470)** (0.579) (0.398) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand  0.401 0.458 0.557 -1.029 -0.290 
 (0.502) (0.644) (0.460) (0.762) (0.575) 
Price of cheese from ROW  0.150 0.236 -0.022 -0.072 -0.292 
  (0.108) (0.157) (0.079) (0.143) (0.335) 
 Expenditure 0.490 1.358 1.046 1.049 1.256 
 (0.253)* (0.355)*** (0.183)*** (0.325)*** (0.699)*
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion -0.016 0.261 0.124 -0.062 -0.714 
 (0.115) (0.169) (0.085) (0.149) (0.330)**
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.141 0.137 -0.006 0.029 0.052 
 (0.046)*** (0.066)* (0.033) (0.061) (0.134) 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona -0.158 0.398 0.118 -0.033 -0.661 
  (0.120) (0.177)** (0.089) (0.158) (0.350)*
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 30: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
South Korean Cheese Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.946 -0.708 0.130 0.027 0.127 
 (0.324)*** (0.339)** (0.196) (0.319) (0.282) 
Price of cheese from EU  -0.359 -1.888 0.340 0.087 0.071 
 (0.191)* (0.399)*** (0.163)** (0.244) (0.240) 
Price of cheese from Australia  0.505 1.171 -1.719 0.278 -0.714 
 (0.418) (0.619)* (0.495)*** (0.637) (0.477) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand 0.220 0.219 0.212 -1.315 -0.275 
 (0.484) (0.664) (0.458) (0.771) (0.582) 
Price of cheese from ROW  0.104 0.049 -0.073 -0.160 -0.340 
 (0.105) (0.166) (0.079) (0.145) (0.324) 
Quarter II -0.023 0.008 0.041 -0.034 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.022)* (0.031) (0.018) 
Quarter III -0.005 0.018 -0.046 0.018 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.022)** (0.030) (0.017) 
Quarter IV -0.0002 0.012 0.049 -0.067 0.006 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.021)** (0.029)** (0.017) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 31: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for South 
Korean Cheese Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -0.864 -0.510 0.319 0.212 0.320 
 (0.307)** (0.317) (0.185)* (0.298) (0.241) 
Price of cheese from EU  -0.310 -1.768 0.455 0.199 0.188 
 (0.192) (0.402)*** (0.165)** (0.243) (0.232) 
Price of cheese from Australia  0.678 1.591 -1.317 0.671 0.050 
 (0.392)* (0.578)** (0.472)** (0.596) (0.386) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand 0.356 0.552 0.531 -1.004 -0.304 
 (0.500) (0.673) (0.472) (0.792) (0.552) 
Price of cheese from ROW  0.140 0.135 0.010 -0.079 -0.255 
  (0.105) (0.167) (0.080) (0.143) (0.325) 
Expenditure 0.476 1.156 1.109 1.083 1.131 
 (0.248)* (0.380)*** (0.185)*** (0.324)*** (0.701) 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion -0.014 0.271 0.134 -0.066 -0.738 
 (0.112) (0.181) (0.085) (0.148) (0.331)**
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.159 0.117 -0.014 0.053 0.061 
 (0.045)*** (0.071) (0.033) (0.060) (0.134) 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona -0.173 0.388 0.120 -0.013 -0.677 
  (0.118) (0.189)* (0.090) (0.157) (0.350)*
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
 
 132
Table 32: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable of 
Japanese Cheese Import Demand using Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia NZ ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -1.683 -0.005 0.229 -0.130 -0.426 
 (0.314)*** (0.079) (0.151) (0.151) (0.257) 
Price of cheese from EU  0.058 -0.419 -0.207 -0.399 -1.040 
 (0.603) (0.308) (0.492) (0.399) (0.647) 
Price of cheese from Australia  2.126 0.094 -2.906 2.142 -1.326 
 (1.172)* (0.500) (1.037)** (0.924)** (1.361) 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand -0.487 -0.199 1.128 -2.203 2.135 
 (0.721) (0.244) (0.574)* (0.687)*** (0.914)** 
Price of cheese from ROW  -0.390 -0.114 0.248 -0.243 -0.547 
 (0.269) (0.088) (0.186) (0.201) (0.491) 
Quarter II 0.007 0.054 -0.068 0.006 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.014)*** (0.024)** (0.012) (0.004) 
Quarter III -0.004 0.046 -0.032 -0.011 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.013)*** (0.023) (0.013) (0.004) 
Quarter IV 0.005 0.050 -0.077 0.022 0.001 
  (0.008) (0.024)** (0.040)* (0.020) (0.007) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 33: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities of Japanese 
Cheese Import Demand using Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of cheese from U.S.  -1.665 0.025 0.300 -0.092 -0.370 
 (0.322)*** (0.081) (0.154)* (0.156) (0.264) 
Price of cheese from EU  0.188 -0.196 0.316 -0.109 -0.622 
 (0.604) (0.311) (0.490) (0.394) (0.649) 
Price of cheese from Australia  2.258 0.320 -2.376 2.435 2.385 
 (1.164)* (0.496) (1.039)** (0.943)** (1.378)* 
Price of cheese from N/Zealand  -0.409 -0.066 1.442 -2.030 -0.903 
 (0.694) (0.236) (0.599)** (0.663)*** (0.879) 
Price of cheese from ROW  -0.372 -0.084 0.318 -0.204 -0.491 
  (0.266) (0.088) (0.184)* (0.198) (0.488) 
Expenditure 0.376 0.642 1.508 0.833 1.204 
 (0.401) (0.148)*** (0.261)*** (0.246)*** (0.379)***
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion 0.112 -0.008 0.023 -0.033 -0.074 
 (0.093) (0.036) (0.063) (0.055) (0.096) 
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.005 0.035 -0.065 0.027 0.115 
 (0.059) (0.024) (0.041) (0.034) (0.054)**
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona 0.107 0.027 -0.042 -0.006 0.041 
  (0.103) (0.040) (0.071) (0.061) (0.106) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 34: Parameter Estimates of Mexico Import Demand for Whey using CBS Model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Intercept -0.040 -0.038 0.078 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.026)*** 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.113 -0.006 0.120 
 (0.043)** (0.034) (0.020)*** 
Price of whey from EU   0.034 -0.028 
  (0.032) (0.016) 
Price of whey from ROW    -0.091 
   (0.015)*** 
Expenditure -0.104 -0.135 0.239 
 (0.076) (0.070)* (0.046)*** 
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 0.053 -0.002 -0.051 
 (0.091) (0.089) (0.060) 
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion -0.036 0.009 0.027 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.040) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 35: Parameter Estimates of Mexico Import Demand for Whey using Rotterdam 
Model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW  
Intercept -0.045 -0.034 0.079 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.024)*** 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.116 -0.004 0.121 
 (0.043)** (0.033) (0.020)*** 
Price of whey from EU   0.027 -0.023 
  (0.031) (0.015) 
Price of whey from ROW    -0.098 
   (0.015)*** 
Expenditure 0.740 -0.027 0.287 
 (0.076) (0.068) (0.044)*** 
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 0.045 0.011 -0.056 
 (0.091) (0.085) (0.057) 
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion -0.030 -0.004 0.034 
 (0.062) (0.058) (0.039) 
** Significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 36: Parameter Estimates of South Korea Import Demand for Whey using CBS 
Model  
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW  
Intercept 0.088 -0.116 0.028 
 (0.060) (0.052)** (0.024) 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.537 0.403 0.133 
 (0.192)** (0.153)** (0.063)** 
Price of whey from EU   -0.454 0.051 
  (0.130)*** (0.046) 
Price of whey from ROW    -0.184 
   (0.030)*** 
Expenditure 0.163 -0.144 -0.019 
 (0.144) (0.123) (0.056) 
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 0.050 -0.029 -0.021 
 (0.077) (0.067) (0.030) 
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion 0.001 -0.002 0.0005 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) 
** Significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 37 Parameter Estimates of Thailand Import Demand for Whey using 
Rotterdam Model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia ROW 
Intercept 0.042 -0.043 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.026) (0.011) 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.200 0.286 -0.078 -0.008 
 (0.182) (0.126)** (0.113) (0.033) 
Price of whey from EU   -0.280 -0.019 0.013 
  (0.130)** (0.082) (0.029) 
Price of whey from Australia   0.073 0.025 
   (0.103) (0.023) 
Price of whey from ROW     -0.030 
    (0.010)*** 
Expenditure 0.509 0.444 0.018 0.029 
 (0.116)*** (0.111)*** (0.074) (0.031) 
U.S.Current Whey Promotion -0.045 -0.042 0.077 0.010 
 (0.070) (0.067) (0.045)* (0.019) 
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion 0.044 0.002 -0.030 -0.016 
 (0.065) (0.062) (0.041) (0.018) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 38: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
Mexican Whey Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.865 0.229 -2.00759 
 (0.092)*** (0.672) (0.646)*** 
Price of whey from EU  -0.095 0.375 -0.87136 
 (0.041)** (0.329) (0.247)*** 
Price of whey from ROW  0.085 -0.256 -1.664 
 (0.025)*** (0.167) (0.224)*** 
Quarter II 0.026 0.013 -0.039 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.031) 
Quarter III 0.015 0.101 -0.116 
 (0.054) (0.051)* (0.035)*** 
Quarter IV 0.110 0.017 -0.127 
  (0.054)* (0.053) (0.036)*** 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 39: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for Mexican 
Whey Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.136 -0.060 1.7736 
 (0.052)** (0.335) (0.300)*** 
Price of whey from EU  -0.007 0.340 -0.416 
 (0.040) (0.322) (0.238)* 
Price of whey from ROW  0.144 -0.280 -1.358 
  (0.024)*** (0.160)* (0.224)*** 
 Expenditure 0.875 -0.348 4.543 
 (0.091)*** (0.700) (0.688)*** 
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 0.064 -0.022 -0.757 
 (0.109) (0.885) (0.891) 
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion -0.043 0.090 0.398 
  (0.074) (0.597) (0.602) 
U.S.Total Whey Promotiona 0.021 0.068 -0.360 
  (0.110) (0.889) (0.901) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 40: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
Mexican Whey Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.880 0.182 -1.75965 
 (0.065)*** (0.501) (0.501)*** 
Price of whey from EU  -0.094 0.299 -0.76792 
 (0.045)* -0.348 (0.256)*** 
Price of whey from ROW  0.085 -0.211 -1.735 
 (0.027)*** (0.167) (0.232)*** 
Quarter II 0.030 0.007 -0.036 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.030) 
Quarter III 0.020 0.095 -0.115 
 (0.054) (0.049)* (0.034)*** 
Quarter IV 0.110 0.022 -0.132 
  (0.055)* (0.051) (0.035)*** 
* Significant at the 10% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 41: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for Mexican 
Whey Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.140 -0.043 1.78845 
 (0.0520)** (0.334) (0.298)*** 
Price of whey from EU  -0.005 0.272 -0.3407 
 (0.040) (0.313) (0.228) 
Price of whey from ROW  0.145 -0.229 -1.448 
  (0.024)*** (0.153) (0.216)*** 
Expenditure 0.889 -0.270 4.263 
 (0.091)*** (0.678) (0.659)*** 
U.S.Current whey Promotion 0.054 0.111 -0.833 
 (0.109) (0.851) (0.848) 
U.S.Lagged whey Promotion -0.036 -0.041 0.506 
  (0.075) (0.574) (0.574) 
U.S.Total whey Promotiona 0.018 0.070 -0.327 
  (0.110) (0.854) (0.858) 
** Significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 42: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
South Korean Whey Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -1.811 0.667 0.614 
 (0.454)*** (0.388)* (0.513) 
Price of whey from EU  0.330 -1.356 0.018 
 (0.369) (0.339)*** (0.398) 
Price of whey from ROW  0.116 0.033 -1.492 
 (0.147) (0.118) (0.235)*** 
Quarter II -0.134 0.169 -0.035 
 (0.104) (0.090)* (0.041) 
Quarter III -0.065 0.113 -0.048 
 (0.068) (0.059)* (0.027)* 
Quarter IV -0.144 0.157 -0.013 
  (0.103) (0.091)* (0.041) 
* Significant at the 10% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 43: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for South 
Korean Whey Import Demand using the CBS model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -1.202 0.960 0.998 
 (0.430)** (0.364)** (0.470)** 
Price of whey from EU  0.903 -1.081 0.379 
 (0.342)** (0.314)*** (0.347) 
Price of whey from ROW  0.299 0.120 -1.377 
  (0.141)** (0.110) (0.226)*** 
Expenditure 1.365 0.657 0.860 
 (0.327)*** (0.300)** (0.462)* 
U.S.Current whey Promotion 0.112 -0.069 -0.135 
 (0.274) (0.262) (0.375) 
U.S.Lagged whey Promotion 0.003 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) 
U.S.Total whey Promotiona 0.114 -0.073 -0.152 
  (0.271) (0.258) (0.371) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 44: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
Thailand Whey Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -1.104 0.254 -0.886 -0.594 
 (0.567)* (0.250) (1.232) (1.166) 
Price of whey from EU  0.035 -0.963 -0.300 -0.103 
 (0.399) (0.264)*** (0.909) (1.089) 
Price of whey from Australia -0.377 -0.113 0.745 0.732 
 (0.337) (0.154) (1.083) (0.763) 
Price of whey from ROW  -0.068 -0.001 0.253 -1.022 
 (0.096) (0.053) (0.236) (0.333)*** 
Quarter II -0.020 0.054 -0.039 0.004 
 (0.059) (0.054) (0.038) (0.016) 
Quarter III -0.091 0.114 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.053)* (0.050)** (0.034) (0.014) 
Quarter IV -0.023 -0.005 0.016 0.012 
  (0.055) (0.053) (0.035) (0.015) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 45: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for Thailand 
Whey Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S EU Australia ROW 
Price of whey from U.S.  -0.596 0.531 -0.822 -0.262 
 (0.542) (0.234)** (1.186) (1.085) 
Price of whey from EU  0.852 -0.519 -0.199 0.429 
 (0.376)** (0.240)** (0.860) (0.958) 
Price of whey from Australia -0.233 -0.035 0.763 0.826 
 (0.336) (0.152) 1.081  (0.757) 
Price of whey from ROW  -0.023 0.024 0.258 -0.993 
  (0.096) (0.053) (0.237) (0.331)*** 
Expenditure 1.514 0.824 0.189 0.987 
 (0.345)*** (0.205)*** (0.775) (1.056) 
U.S.Current whey Promotion -0.134 -0.078 0.809 0.326 
 (0.208) (0.123) (0.468)* (0.639) 
U.S.Lagged whey Promotion 0.130 0.004 -0.313 -0.536 
 (0.193) (0.115) (0.434) (0.598) 
U.S.Total whey Promotiona -0.003 -0.074 0.496 -0.210 
  (0.195) (0.116) (0.438) (0.599) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 46: Parameter Estimates of Mexico Import Demand for NFDM using Rotterdam 
Model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Canada New Zealand ROW 
Intercept -0.249 -0.031 0.095 0.014 0.170 
 (0.136)* (0.199) (0.079) (0.067) (0.212) 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  0.098 0.052 -0.027 -0.093 -0.031 
 (0.254) (0.281) (0.132) (0.145) (0.372) 
Price of NFDM from EU   -0.940 0.120 0.321 0.446 
  (0.389)** (0.159) (0.321) (0.518) 
Price of NFDM from Canada    -0.025 -0.126 0.057 
   (0.078) (0.072)* (0.105) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand    -0.223 0.121 
    (0.136) (0.184) 
Price of NFDM from ROW      -0.593 
     (0.110)**
Expenditure 0.254 0.092 0.137 -0.046 0.563 
 (0.227) (0.406) (0.162) (0.104) (0.537) 
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) 
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion 0.008 -0.007 0.002 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
* Significant at the 10% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 47: Parameter Estimates of Japanese Import Demand for NFDM using Rotterdam Model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand Ukraine ROW 
Intercept 0.096 -0.146 -0.082 0.060 -0.053 0.125 
 (0.080) (0.040)*** (0.082) (0.050) (0.055) (0.069)* 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  0.006 0.026 -0.005 -0.013 -0.044 0.030 
 (0.028) (0.013)* (0.028) (0.016) (0.017)** (0.023) 
Price of NFDM from EU   -0.156 -0.194 0.068 0.160 0.096 
  (0.013)* (0.135) (0.077) (0.093) (0.110) 
Price of NFDM from Australia    -0.112 -0.071 0.227 0.154 
   (0.477) (0.258) (0.274) (0.376) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand     -0.348 0.076 0.288 
    (0.196)* (0.194) (0.221) 
Price of NFDM from Ukraine      -0.107 -0.313 
     (0.348) (0.361) 
Price of NFDM from ROW       -0.256 
      (0.023) 
Expenditure 0.036 0.155 0.387 0.280 0.106 0.035 
 (0.071) (0.035)*** (0.078)*** (0.048)*** (0.051)* (0.067) 
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion 0.002 -0.007 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.002)*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 48: Parameter Estimates of Thailand Import Demand for NFDM using 
Rotterdam Model  
 
Independent variable  U.S EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Intercept 0.249 -0.226 0.024 -0.081 0.033 
 (0.106)** (0.102)* (0.086) (0.046)* (0.051) 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  -0.067 0.086 -0.059 -0.269 0.310 
 (0.262) (0.238) (0.206) (0.109)** (0.120)**
Price of NFDM from EU   -0.159 0.142 -0.144 0.075 
  (0.728) (0.636) (0.343) (0.275) 
Price of NFDM from Australia    0.066 -0.126 -0.023 
   (0.718) (0.374) (0.284) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand    0.453 0.086 
    (0.434) (0.173) 
Price of NFDM from ROW      -0.449 
     (0.024) 
Expenditure 0.448 0.193 0.207 0.117 0.036 
 (0.095)*** (0.090)*** (0.077)** (0.041)*** (0.047) 
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion -0.010 0.009 -0.003 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)*
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 49: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
Mexican NFDM Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Canada 
New 
Zealand ROW 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  -0.054 0.035 -0.763 -0.674 -4.308 
 (0.603) (1.683) (1.059) (1.478) (5.309) 
Price of NFDM from EU  -0.001 -4.578 0.746 3.155 4.593 
 (0.612) (1.990)** (1.303) (3.080) (7.271) 
Price of NFDM from Canada  -0.118 0.521 -0.339 -1.144 0.721 
 (0.255) (0.826) (0.645) (0.704) (1.489) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand -0.244 1.487 -1.138 -2.080 -0.031 
 (0.296) (1.486) (0.575)* (1.265) (2.562) 
Price of NFDM from ROW  -0.100 2.097 0.383 1.183 -8.873 
 (0.746) (2.469) (0.853) (1.747) (2.351)***
Quarter II 0.427 0.121 -0.098 -0.104 -0.347 
 (0.202) ** (0.275) (0.107) (0.100) (0.318) 
Quarter III 0.451 -0.230 -0.105 -0.043 -0.073 
 (0.157) *** (0.292) (0.097) (0.078) (0.224) 
Quarter IV 0.291 0.150 -0.185 0.075 -0.331 
  (0.196) (0.356) (0.143) (0.113) (0.394) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 50: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for Mexican 
NFDM Import Demand using Rotterdam Model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Canada 
New 
Zealand ROW 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  0.200 0.250 -0.217 -0.890 -0.431 
 (0.517) (1.342) (1.002) (1.382) (5.207) 
Price of NFDM from EU  0.107 -4.486 0.979 3.062 6.247 
 (0.573) (1.855)** (1.296) (3.062) (7.260) 
Price of NFDM from Canada  -0.054 0.575 -0.202 -1.198 0.797 
 (0.251) (0.761) (0.634) (0.688)* (1.471) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand -0.190 1.533 -1.021 -2.126 1.692 
 (0.295) (1.532) (0.586)* (1.295) (2.570) 
Price of NFDM from ROW  -0.063 2.128 0.462 1.152 -8.310 
  (0.757) (2.473) (0.854) (1.749) (2.398)***
Expenditure 0.517 0.438 1.111 -0.440 7.892 
 (0.462) (1.936) (0.530)** (0.663) (1.691)***
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion 0.002 0.015 -0.036 -0.014 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.048) (0.026) (0.031) (0.082) 
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion 0.017 -0.032 0.017 -0.036 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) (0.031) (0.083) 
U.S.Total NFDM Promotiona 0.019 -0.017 -0.019 -0.050 0.025 
  (0.031) (0.055) (0.034) (0.039) (0.112) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 51: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable of Japanese NFDM Import Demand using 
the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand Ukraine ROW 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  0.023 0.073 -0.385 -0.149 -0.254 0.182 
 (0.277) (0.106) (0.254) (0.062)** (0.086)*** (0.175) 
Price of NFDM from EU  0.201 -1.341 -2.093 0.108 0.676 0.636 
 (0.158) (0.575)** (1.160)* (0.270) (0.430) (0.769) 
Price of NFDM from Australia  -0.085 -1.612 -1.343 -0.362 0.991 1.038 
 (0.279) (1.037) (4.115) (0.913) (1.276) (2.629) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand  -0.226 0.176 -1.548 -1.498 0.211 1.927 
 (0.246) (0.566) (2.106) (0.658)** (0.858) (1.461) 
Price of NFDM from Ukraine  -0.497 0.962 1.223 0.053 -0.598 -2.217 
 (0.224)** (0.715) (2.375) (0.693) (1.626) (2.532) 
Price of NFDM from ROW  0.255 0.562 0.838 0.868 -1.514 -1.807 
 (0.243) (0.826) (3.172) (0.763) (1.651) (3.439) 
Quarter II -0.220 0.224 0.311 -0.022 -0.086 -0.206 
 (0.151) (0.072)*** (0.144)** (0.083) (0.090) (0.120) 
Quarter III -0.046 0.122 -0.036 -0.100 0.262 -0.201 
 (0.081) (0.043)** (0.092) (0.061) (0.072)*** (0.082)** 
Quarter IV -0.093 0.183 0.061 -0.134 0.084 -0.102 
  (0.137) (0.068)** (0.136)* (0.081) (0.087) (0.114) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 52: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities of Japanese NFDM Import Demand using Rotterdam 
model 
       
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand Ukraine ROW 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  0.059 0.196 -0.039 -0.046 -0.203 0.207 
 (0.271) (0.102)* (0.236) (0.056) (0.080)** (0.162) 
Price of NFDM from EU  0.247 -1.186 -1.658 0.237 0.741 0.668 
 (0.128)* (0.572)* (1.158) (0.270) (0.428)* (0.761) 
Price of NFDM from Australia  -0.044 -1.474 -0.956 -0.247 1.049 1.067 
 (0.264) (1.030) (4.078) (0.902) (1.263) (2.602) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand  -0.127 0.513 -0.603 -1.218 0.350 1.997 
 (0.154) (0.586) (2.202) (0.687)* (0.896) (1.529) 
Price of NFDM from Ukraine  -0.421 1.218 1.940 0.266 -0.492 -2.165 
 (0.165)** (0.703)* (2.336) (0.679) (1.607) (2.496) 
Price of NFDM from ROW  0.287 0.732 1.316 1.010 -1.444 -1.771 
  (0.223) (0.834) (3.211) (0.773) (1.665) (3.465) 
Expenditure 0.347 1.179 3.307 0.980 0.488 0.243 
 (0.679) (0.266)*** (0.668)*** (0.169)*** (0.237)* (0.465) 
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion 0.020 -0.049 0.029 -0.006 0.009 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.016)*** (0.037) (0.009) (0.012) (0.025) 
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion -0.009 -0.016 0.015 0.001 -0.009 0.021 
 (0.042) (0.017) (0.041) (0.009) (0.014) (0.029) 
U.S.Total NFDM Promotiona 0.011 -0.065 0.044 -0.005 0.0001 0.027 
  (0.046) (0.017)*** (0.040) (0.009) (0.014) (0.029) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 53: Marshallian Price Elasticities and Estimates of the Seasonality Variable for 
Thailand NFDM Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  -1.452 0.204 -0.233 -1.393 4.923 
 (3.915) (0.665) (0.649) (0.547) ** (1.916)**
Price of NFDM from EU  -1.114 -0.637 0.217 -0.937 1.001 
 (3.646) (2.052) (2.022) (1.741) (4.431) 
Price of NFDM from Australia  -2.995 0.228 0.005 -0.819 1.204 
 (3.113) (1.773) (2.288) (1.889) (4.554) 
Price of NFDM from N/Zealand -5.371 -0.511 -0.533 2.161 -0.483 
 (1.658)*** (0.956) (1.180) (2.174) (2.771) 
Price of NFDM from ROW  4.226 0.177 -0.115 0.397 -7.216 
 (1.799)** (0.766) (0.895) (0.868) (3.268)**
Quarter II -0.479 0.525 -0.057 0.067 -0.057 
 (0.182)** (0.175)*** (0.149) (0.081) (0.088) 
Quarter III -0.089 0.274 -0.159 0.059 -0.085 
 (0.029) (0.124)** (0.105) (0.054) (0.062) 
Quarter IV -0.379 0.101 0.090 0.224 -0.036 
  (0.162)** (0.152) (0.130) (0.067)*** (0.078) 
** Significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 54: Estimated Promotion, Expenditure, and Hicksian Elasticities for Thailand 
NFDM Import Demand using the Rotterdam model 
 
 
Independent variable  U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
Price of NFDM from U.S.  -1.004 0.240 -0.189 -1.353 4.961 
 (3.920) (0.666) (0.650) (0.548)** (1.919)**
Price of NFDM from EU  1.286 -0.444 0.453 -0.726 1.205 
 (3.572) (2.034) (2.010) (1.724) (4.394) 
Price of NFDM from Australia  -0.890 0.397 0.211 -0.633 -0.370 
 (3.082) (1.778) (2.287) (1.881) (4.541) 
Price of NFDM from 
N/Zealand  -4.036 -0.403 -0.402 2.278 1.383 
 (1.634)** (0.958) (1.182) (2.181)* (2.769) 
Price of NFDM from ROW  4.645 0.210 -0.074 0.434 -7.180 
  (1.797)** (0.767) (0.896) (0.869) (3.273)**
Expenditure 6.706 0.538 0.659 0.590 0.570 
 (1.032)*** (0.181)*** (0.202)*** (0.158)*** (0.548) 
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion -0.149 0.026 -0.011 -0.018 0.120 
 (0.121) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.067)* 
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion 0.039 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.032 
 (0.123) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) -0.066 
U.S.Total NFDM Promotiona -0.109 0.022 -0.008 -0.017 0.087 
  (0.147) (0.028) (0.029) (0.023) (0.084) 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 55: Marginal Returns to U.S. Cheese Promotion Expenditures 
      
Mexico (CBS)      
 U.S. EU Uruguay New Zealand ROW 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion 29.85 6.19 -9.51 -15.42 -10.70 
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -8.97 -6.70 7.40 0.97 8.40 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona 20.95 -0.49 -2.13 -14.48 -2.33 
      
South Korea (CBS)      
 U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion -1.08 11.32 16.37 -6.95 -80.25**
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -9.45*** 6.00* -0.82 3.25 5.93 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona -10.50 17.34** 15.63 -3.74 -74.68* 
      
South Korea (Rotterdam)      
 U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion -0.95 11.76 17.67 -7.46 -83.03**
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -10.63*** 5.12 -1.81 6.06 6.97 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona -11.53 16.92** 15.94 -1.45 -76.44**
      
Japan (Rotterdam)      
 U.S. EU Australia New Zealand ROW 
U.S.Current Cheese Promotion 4.98 -2.80 7.79 -6.68 -3.29 
U.S.Lagged Cheese Promotion -0.21 11.66 -22.09 5.39 5.12** 
U.S.Total Cheese Promotiona 4.77 8.86 -14.31 -1.29 1.84 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 56 Marginal Returns to U.S. Whey Promotion Expenditures 
     
Mexico (CBS)     
 U.S. EU ROW  
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 19.85 -0.78 -20.85  
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion -13.83 3.28 11.35  
U.S.Total Whey Promotiona 6.63 2.43 -10.08  
     
Mexico (Rotterdam)     
 U.S. EU ROW  
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 16.77 3.92 -22.94  
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion -11.60 -1.49 14.44  
U.S.Total Whey Promotiona 5.69 2.53 -9.18  
     
South Korea (CBS)     
 U.S. EU ROW  
U.S.Current Whey Promotion 11.40 -6.53 -4.75  
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion 0.31 -0.42 0.12  
U.S.Total Whey Promotiona 11.93 -7.07 -4.72  
     
Thailand (Rotterdam)     
  U.S. EU Australia ROW 
U.S.Current Whey Promotion -5.98 -5.97 11.07* 1.36 
U.S.Lagged Whey Promotion 6.47 0.31 -4.75 -2.48 
U.S.Total Whey Promotiona -0.15 -5.99 7.15 -0.92 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Table 57: Marginal Returns to U.S. NFDM Promotion Expenditures 
  
Mexico (Rotterdam)       
 U.S. EU Canada NZ ROW  
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion 25.51 62.63 -78.40 -32.09 36.75  
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion 194.88 -126.01 34.96 -81.63 2.87  
U.S.Total NFDM Promotiona 224.27 -67.70 -40.85 -114.86 38.85  
       
Thailand (Rotterdam)       
 U.S. EU Australia NZ ROW  
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion -29.20 28.61 -9.47 -11.74 20.49*  
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion 8.04 -5.09 2.20 0.86 -5.77  
U.S.Total NFDM Promotiona -21.88 24.17 -7.50 -11.12 15.23  
       
Japan (Rotterdam)       
 U.S. EU Australia New Zealand Ukraine ROW 
U.S.Current NFDM Promotion 16.11 -63.77** 38.87 -16.26 17.85 7.78 
U.S.Lagged NFDM Promotion -7.29 -20.09 19.73 1.53 -17.68 29.66 
U.S.Total NFDM Promotiona 8.82 -83.86** 58.59 -14.73 0.17 37.44 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level. 
a represents both current and lag promotion expenditure elasticities. 
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Figure 1: Major Exporters Global Volume Market Shares in Cheese,  
2000-05 Average 
 
 
Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/FAS. Production, Supply, and 
Distribution. (USDA/FAS/PS & D), Official USDA Estimates. Internet Site: 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. (Accessed: August 4, 2006). 
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Figure 2: Major Exporters Global Volume Market Shares in NFDM,  
2000-2005 Average 
 
 
  Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/FAS. Production, Supply, and 
Distribution. (USDA/FAS/PS & D), Official USDA Estimates. Internet Site: 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp. (Accessed: August 4, 2006). 
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Figure 3: Major Exporters Global Volume Market Share in Dried Whey,  
2000 -2005 Average 
 
 
Source: Compiled from FAO Statistical Data (FAOSTAT).   Internet Site: 
 http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?version=ext&hasbulk=0&subset=agriculture 
(Accessed: January 8, 2008). 
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Figure 4: Composition of U.S. Dairy Exports’ Value, 2005. 
 
 
Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/ERS. FATUS Export Aggregation. Internet 
Site:  http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrdscripts/USReport.exe. (Accessed September 19, 2006). 
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Figure 5: Top 10 Destinations for U.S. Dairy Products: 1998 – 2005 Total Values 
 
 
Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/ERS. FATUS Export Aggregation. Internet 
Site:  http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrdscripts/USReport.exe. (Accessed September 19, 2006). 
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Figure 6: Top 10 Destinations for U.S. Cheese: 1998-2005 Total Values 
 
Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/ERS. FATUS Export Aggregation. Internet 
Site:  http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrdscripts/USReport.exe.  
(Accessed September 19, 2006). 
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Figure 7: Top 10 Destinations for U.S. Whey: 1998-2005 Total Values 
 
Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/ERS. FATUS Export Aggregation. Internet 
Site:  http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrdscripts/USReport.exe.  
(Accessed September 19, 2006). 
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Figure 8: Top 10 Destinations for U.S. NFDM: 1998-2005 Total Values 
 
Source: Based on Data Compiled from USDA/ERS. FATUS Export Aggregation. Internet 
Site:  http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrdscripts/USReport.exe.  
(Accessed September 19, 2006). 
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